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The Arab Spring uprisings stunned both rulers and peoples in the Arab world and raised high expectations of a new dawn with popular sovereignty and democratisation replacing authoritarian regimes. Nowhere did these events seem more dramatic than in Egypt.

Throughout much of its modern history, Egypt was seen as a major power and leader in the Arab world in terms of politics, military strength, religion, education, and culture. It has also been an exemplar of Arab autocracy and authoritarianism, governed by three successive regimes from 1952 to 2011: Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956–1970), Anwar Sadat (1970–1981), and finally Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011), who was overthrown in the Arab Spring uprising. Mubarak by far was the most authoritarian of the three.

The legitimacy and security of these regimes over the years have been based, in part, on the calculated implementation of an autocratic political system that emphasised top-down rule and the close relationship between the regime and the country’s military, police, and other security forces.

2011 ushered in an unpredictable series of popular Arab uprisings by pro-democracy movements in the Arab world, often called the Arab Spring or Arab Awakening. The toppling Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime on January 14, 2011 became the catalyst that sparked Egyptian demonstrations, which erupted only eleven days later. In contrast to Tunisia, a country of 10 million people, where it took twenty-eight days to depose its dictator, pro-democracy activists in Egypt, with its population of 85 million, required only eighteen days to accomplish the same feat.

By February 11, Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign in disgrace. The toppling of Ben Ali after his twenty-three-year reign and of Mubarak after his twenty-nine-year rule struck fear in the hearts of many rulers. The events sparked uprisings in Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria and inspired protests in Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and Oman.

The historic campaign to oust Mubarak represented not only the dawning of a new era in Egyptian and Arab-state politics, but also the first real emergence of a new public sphere – one that ran parallel to the state. In this new rhetorical space, which was nurtured by social media tools and online organising, activists were able to gather, discuss ideas, establish shared perspectives, network with like-minded citizens, and communicate their desires and political beliefs in a way that, under ordinary circumstances, would have landed them in jail. This new climate of communication, combined with decades of grievances, corruption, un-kept government promises, and increased authoritarianism, proved to be explosive.
Egypt’s pro-democracy uprising was a popular revolution – a revolt of people, not a well-defined organisation with a charismatic leader or defined leadership. Many of the activists and demonstrators were young, well educated, and politically and internationally aware in large part due to mass communications and social media. They were motivated not necessarily by the ideologies and slogans of Arab nationalism and socialism or Islamism but by pragmatic issues. As one political chant went: “Bread, freedom, and social justice.” This was broad-based, supported by the secular and religiously minded, young and old, men and women, Muslim and Christian, the poor, middle and upper classes.

If in the past, the question had been “Is Arab culture or Islam compatible with democracy?” the question and concern evolved to “Are the old guards and entrenched elites (military, courts, police, security, government bureaucrats, and other political and economic elites associated with the Mubarak government) as well as Islamists ready for the transition to democracy?”

Like other Arab Spring uprisings, protesters reclaimed their sense of dignity and respect and were driven by long-standing political and economic grievances: the lack of good governance and accountability; the rule of law and freedoms; large-scale corruption; accumulation of the country’s wealth in the hands of the ruling elites; a growing gap between a rich elite minority and the middle class and poor; high unemployment levels; and a lack of opportunity and a sense of a future.

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was not at the forefront of the protest, nor did they speak out publicly or rally supporters, though individual members did join the protests in Tahrir (Liberation) Square. Prominent religious leaders, Muslim and Christian, were initially silent or publicly unsupportive. As pro-democracy activists’ signs, placards, statements, and demands demonstrate, protesters espoused Egyptian unity/nationalism, spoke of one Egypt, and sang the Egyptian national anthem. They waved Egyptian flags not Islamist placards.

Celebration of the Arab Spring in Egypt was tempered by fear that it might be hijacked by remnants of the Mubarak regime’s institutions. At a workshop co-sponsored by the Centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding in Istanbul, in early October 2011, “The Arab Awakening: Transitioning from Dictatorship to Democracy,” an Egyptian activist, as activists from Tunisia and elsewhere identified the nature of the threat to a democratic transition: “The Egyptian revolution was peaceful. Whereas the French, American, Russian revolutions ended with thousands getting their heads cut off or killed otherwise, imprisoned, or fired, in Egypt the heads we spared are speaking and working against the revolution – how do we deal with this?” Another activist asked, “Is Egypt transitioning from Mubarak authoritarianism to new military-security regime using a democratic facade?”
Fears that the revolution would result in a new military-security regime were real to many. After all, the military controlled as much as 30 to 40 percent of Egypt’s economy and was for years autonomous with little or no governmental oversight or accountability. Many senior military officials used their power and influence to develop vast economic and business interests. Military-owned companies and business interests include ownership of vast amounts of land, buying and selling of real estate, construction companies, farms, high-tech slaughterhouses, nurseries, child care services, cafeteria services, automobile repair and hotel administration, gas stations, domestic cleaning services, chicken and dairy farms, manufacturing food products like pasta, bottled water, pesticides, optical equipment, production of small arms and explosives, exercise equipment, fire engines, and even plastic table covers. There was no regulation regarding accountability or transparency.

Though the Brotherhood had not been among the early demonstrators in Tahrir Square, they quickly emerged as the key political organisation in a state in which they had been the leading opposition. They had done so with a widespread reputation for lack of corruption, deliverance of social services, and a willingness to suffer repression and imprisonment as the price for standing up to the Mubarak regime. Their position and that of their political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), established in the aftermath of the revolution, was strengthened by their strong presence throughout the diverse communities they served across Egypt, their experience in previous elections, and the fact that in the year after the overthrow of Mubarak, the non-Islamist activists were unable to unite in an effective political organisation of their own.

In 2011 and 2012, Egyptians went to the polls to vote in parliamentary elections and Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party received a plurality of votes; the two major Islamist blocs together received nearly two-thirds of the vote. Then in June 2012, Morsi defeated Ahmed Shafiq by a margin of 52 to 48 percent (more than the margin that Barack Obama received when he defeated Mitt Romney in 2012) to win the presidency.

The successes of the Brotherhood as an opposition Islamist movement did not translate into effective leadership as a political party (FJP). Morsi failed to adequately reach out early enough to build a strong and diverse political coalition. The fragile democratic transition was shattered as Egyptian society became polarised to an unprecedented degree with many original Tahrir Square protestors and so-called liberals abandoning democracy, embracing a military-led coup to depose Egypt’s first democratically-elected president.

On June 30, 2013, thousands of protestors gathered in Tahrir Square, the site of the protests that ousted Mubarak, and millions more across the country took to the streets in mass mobilisations. The Morsi-appointed defence minister and military chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi issued a forty-eight-
hour ultimatum to the president: reach a compromise or the military would intervene. The following day, Morsi addressed the Egyptian people and announced that he rejected the ultimatum and called on Egyptians to support democracy and honour the democratic election that brought him to power.

On July 3, el-Sisi announced that he had suspended the constitution, removed Morsi from power, and nominated the head of the Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour, as the country’s interim president. The interim government, an illegitimate product of a military-backed coup, proceeded to act very much like the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser in the past, seeking to crush and destroy the Brotherhood. It massacred large numbers of the Brotherhood and other opposition in what some claimed was the largest bloodbath in modern Egyptian history. The security forces deliberately used violence and killing to provoke non-violent pro-Morsi demonstrators to take up arms and fire back, and declared its intention to outlaw the MB (as Nasser had, but neither Sadat nor Mubarak did).

The military junta and its appointed government turned to the courts and, arresting Brotherhood leaders on trumped-up charges, blamed the victims of violence for the violence and threatening state security. In fact it was a counterrevolution led by many Mubarak regime appointees, in particular the military and judiciary.

The military and its government did not pursue the democratic process to legitimate their power by using parliamentary and presidential elections to discredit the Brotherhood, unseat and replace a democratically elected government, and establish their own legitimate government. Instead, they put themselves above the rule of law: with a coup, massacres of civilian demonstrators (including many women and children), arrest and illegal detention of thousands of Brotherhood leaders and members, restoration of the dreaded Emergency Law, and resort to trials by a corrupt court system.

The government introduced measures to suppress peaceful opposition and free expression. It banned public protests, required government approval for public meetings, and cracked down on nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). Democracy activists, secular as well as non-secular, who had been at the heart of the struggle for democracy in 2011 and 2012, were imprisoned; an Egyptian court banned the liberal secular April 6 Movement, which initially supported the coup, in April 2014. The government took control of the universities, appointing its presidents and arresting university students and schoolchildren accused of “sabotaging” educational facilities. Secret military trials were expanded to include civilians. In a country where most newspapers were no longer independent and supported the government, newspaper editors were pressured to agree not to criticize “state institutions,” in particular the army, police, and judiciary.
The euphoria and hopes of Egypt’s Arab Spring with the overthrow of Mubarak and Egypt’s first democratic elections and of those who supported the military-led coup have been shattered. The post-coup period saw democratic aspirations wither as Egyptians experienced the most violent use of force and killing by the military in modern Egyptian history, and under President al-Sisi, the restoration of authoritarianism and repression, release of Hosni Mubarak and in April 2015 the sentencing of Mohammad Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, to death.

As in the past under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, al-Sisi has sought to co-opt or control religion and religious institutions. However, Egypt’s history provides examples of how the appeal to Islam by autocrats can backfire. Nasser’s ostensible eradication of the Brotherhood had two significant effects on Anwar Sadat’s presidency. When Sadat came to power and released many of MB and others imprisoned for years and tortured, the majority of the MB, ostensibly crushed or eliminated by Gamal Abdel Nasser, re-emerged, rebuilt, and established itself as the major (though unofficial) political opposition party.

Professor John L. Esposito

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Past President of the American Academy of Religion and Middle East Studies Association of North America, Esposito has served as consultant to the U.S. Department of State and other agencies, European and Asian governments, corporations, universities, and media worldwide; also served as ambassador for the UN Alliance of Civilizations and a member of the World Economic Forum’s Council of 100 Leaders and E. C. European Network of Experts on De-Radicalisation. He has received honorary doctorates from St. Michael’s College, University of Toronto, the University of Sarajevo, University of Florida and Immaculata University as well as the American Academy of Religion’s Martin E. Marty Award for the Public Understanding of Religion, Pakistan’s Quaid-i-Azzam Award for Outstanding Contributions in Islamic Studies, Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service Outstanding Teacher Award and Georgetown’s Career Research Achievement Award.

Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?, Religion and Global Order (with M. Watson), Islam and Secularism in the Middle East (with A. Tamimi), Iran at the Crossroads (with R.K. Ramazani), Islam, Gender, and Social Change and Muslims on the Americanization Path and Daughters of Abraham (with Y. Haddad), and Women in Muslim Family Law. Esposito's books and articles have been translated into more than 35 languages.


*   *   *   *
Executive Summary

1. The immediate recent history of the Middle-East, North Africa and Gulf region right through to present day, has seen a period of extreme instability, the rise and fall of groups, of political parties, and the establishment of entities that are a cause for significant concern within those host nations, and within the international community at large.

2. This period of instability, highlighted by the Arab Spring, has been inappropriately characterised by many western media outlets, as being as a result of Islam and its followers, thus fostering a deep mistrust and suspicion of any of those individuals or groups who identify themselves as Muslim or following an Islamic or Islamist ideology.

3. The word ‘Muslim’ is no longer simply synonymous with a religion of the Middle East, as Christianity and Judaism is in the West; it has become synonymous with the emergence of radical and extremist groups that espouse a wholly warped and unrecognisable interpretation of Islam.

4. A number who simply see it as a basis upon which an alternative agenda can be pursued have seized upon this suspicion and fear to pursue their own aims.

5. South East Asia, and Bangladesh in particular, is currently undergoing its own political and social struggles and yet rather than addressing the root cause of these issues, an autocratic ruling party using secularism as a banner, the Awami League, seeks to identify one particular party as being primary responsible, that of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami. Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami remains a legitimate political party whose ideals are founded in Islam, and thus the criticisms on the world stage of a party with such an ideology gains traction given the media hysteria centred on anything ‘Islamist’, allowing ignorance to draw comparisons between any Muslim and their extremist counter-parts like al-Qaeda and more recently Da’esh/Islamic State/ISIL.
6. The clear tactics of a government seeking to undermine a political opposition on such grounds is thus given an air of credibility.

7. Parallels can be drawn with any group whose principles are founded in Islam, in a host of nations whose ruling regime fear the loss of their power, or fear the voice of the people being heard.

8. There is no justification for this level of scrutiny and it is notable that the same cannot be said of those other groups that are faith-based but follow a perverse and unrecognisable interpretation of that ideology.

9. Faith played a central role in the on-going violence in Northern Ireland, Union and Loyalists, were either Protestant or Catholic respectively.

10. The violence espoused was based on the ideological loyalty, yet Christianity as a faith was not scrutinised.

11. The Rohingya in Myanmar are persecuted solely on the basis of faith -- persecution encouraged by numerous, but essentially, fundamentalist Buddhism.

12. This has not lead to criticism or analysis of mistrust of those who follow a Buddhist ideology.

13. The Ku Klux Klan, perhaps one of the most infamous of white supremacist groups had an ideology based on Christianity and saw itself as a right wing Christian group at heart. This did not give rise to a deeper analysis of the Christian Church in the United States and whether other groups based on this particular Abrahamic religion were a danger.

14. Babbar Khalsa is a Sikh movement with the aim of establishing an independent Khalistan within the Punjab region of India, and was added to the UK list of ‘proscribed organisations’ in March 2001.

15. There is no suggestion however that all Sikhs or those other groups whose ideology is founded on this basis are to be a cause for concern.
16. Christianity is perhaps the best comparison when dealing with historical issues and how teachings and ideology can change over time. Further, it is perhaps the most appropriate example to draw in dealing with the present subject.

17. The period of the ‘Crusades’ 1095-1291 showed a number of Christians, in particular the Templar Knights, to be medieval religious extremists, waging war in the Middle East solely on the basis of a religious ideology that had been sanctioned by the head of the Catholic Church, the Pope.

18. The Pope who decreed that all sins would be forgiven for those who embarked upon a crusade; and a crusade whose combatants saw themselves as soldiers of God and therefore proving their total devotion to God.

19. The modern day position is very different, but it does show how far the Christian religious ideology has developed and changed.

20. Why therefore should a different approach be taken when dealing with Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Christianity or any other established or developed faith-based groups that espouse an ideology?

21. When one looks to Islam, and in particular any Salafist branch of Islam, the answer is that it serves an altogether more sinister interest.

22. The more appropriate position to adopt would be that these are groups based on violence that follow violence as a means by which to impose their ideals under the thin veil of faith, however this approach has not been taken, and thus a situation has been exacerbated further.

23. It is accepted that those who follow an extremist ideology have sought to justify their actions through their own radical religious interpretation, but that should not reflect on all those that follow Islam.

24. Anecdotally, when a German journalist from a mainstream German newspaper inquired of the President of the Islamic Bank in Jeddah as to how he feels about being part of the same religious ideology as Osama Bin Laden, the response was answered by any equal question. How does it feel for the journalist to be from
the same religious and cultural upbringing as Adolf Hitler? The irony was clearly not lost on the journalist.

25. Others therefore have seized upon the situation created as a means to further their own political agendas, and unfortunately others such as the mainstream media have fallen into this trap and thus given such tactics credibility.

26. It appears that any action can be justified if announced that it is under the auspices of the ‘War on Terror’. Actions such as the removal of the most basic of human rights and fundamental freedoms such as a fair trial. Actions that many of us take for granted such as the freedom of speech and the freedom to protest have effectively been removed all under the anti-terror rhetoric. Rhetoric that in reality is nothing other than the thinnest of veils over a nationwide power grab; rhetoric solely designed to attempt to lend credibility to a regimes anti-civil society, anti-human rights, and ultimately anti-democratic policies.
Methodology

27. The catalyst for this report was the recent publication of a report entitled “The History of the Muslim Brotherhood” by a legal team at the Chambers of Anthony Berry QC, 9 Bedford Row, London.

28. That report has been considered in significant detail, and as much as the remainder of this report does not follow the same organisational structure, it deals with similar themes in an effort to provide balance to the conclusions drawn previously and to correct some of the fundamental errors and generalisations. It is respectfully submitted that “The History of the Muslim Brotherhood” report makes a number of sweeping allegations that are not borne out by objective reporting or reliable data.

29. This report has been compiled following an analysis of ‘open source’ material by respected academics on the Muslim Brotherhood specifically, and further, Islamic and middle-eastern studies more generally.

30. Associated media publications have also been given appropriate consideration.

31. Where applicable and available digitally, direct hyperlink references to those documents and publications quoted have been noted and where there is a lack of credible sources for the allegations raised those matters have also been properly considered.

32. Direct assistance with regard to specific elements of this report, particularly the historical position has been provided by Professor John Esposito of Georgetown University, Dr Anas Altikriti of The Cordoba Foundation and other sources that have requested to remain anonymous due to the existence of repercussions in the Arab Republic of Egypt and elsewhere.
Chapter 1: Introduction

33. On 2 April 2015 the Chambers of Anthony Berry QC, 9 Bedford Row, London, released its report entitled ‘The History of the Muslim Brotherhood’. The report authors clearly disclose that it was commissioned by the ‘State Lawsuit (Litigation) Authority of Egypt, which whilst it does not impact on the legitimacy of the report, it does demonstrate that it is a report commissioned by the Military Coup Regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

34. In order to demonstrate equal measure of transparency, it is important to note that one of the author’s of this report, Toby Cadman, is also a member of the Chambers of Anthony Berry QC, 9 Bedford Row, London, although he did not contribute to ‘The History of the Muslim Brotherhood’ report nor is he part of providing any legal services to the ‘State Lawsuit (Litigation) Authority of Egypt nor is he engaged to advise the Military Coup Regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Cadman has advised the political opposition in Egypt since the military coup of July 2013.

35. Egypt, which has all but declared war on the Muslim Brotherhood, and a state that resorted to an armed military coup d’état so as to remove the first and only democratically-elected president of Egypt, President Mohammad Morsi.

36. Having re-imposed military rule and therefore autocracy by default, the extreme step of designating the Muslim Brotherhood a criminal group was taken, a step followed by other autocratic regimes across the Middle East and Gulf States.

37. Having considered this recent report it is clear that it is to serve as a further weapon in the arsenal of the current Egyptian President, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi who is seeking to justify the criminalising of the Muslim Brotherhood, whilst at the same time desperately seeking both domestic and wider international credibility for his own illegitimate government, and policies that have removed rights that are considered to be the bedrock of any democracy; rights such as the freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly, freedom from arbitrary
arrest, torture, extra-judicial killing and importantly the right to a fair trial – an absolute right.

38. It comes as little surprise therefore that ‘The History of the Muslim Brotherhood’ report centres on the Muslim Brotherhood and how its ideology is alleged to have influenced and be central to the development of a number of extremist groups such as al-Qaeda, Da'esh, Boko-Haram, and al Qassam Brigades for example; moreover it is accused of espousing and supporting the use of violence, and continues to support these proscribed groups.

39. The inference to be drawn from the report is clear, that the Muslim Brotherhood is one and the same with these extremist groups that they cannot be seen as a legitimate faith-based movement, and thus the criminalisation of the group and prosecution of its members is wholly justified when trying to bring about stability to a fractured and chaotic state.

40. What is not dealt with however, is that any group whose ideology is based upon faith can be linked to any other group that follows a similar faith if one is to look hard enough.

41. This report does not seek to suggest that there are no terrorist organisations or groups with an extremist ideology who have members that may or may not have links to the Muslim Brotherhood, but, this is no different than any other group and certainly does not suggest that a group as an entity can be deemed to be responsible for the actions of the few.

42. Further, we must also consider how groups develop over time, and an ideology espoused at one point in history does not necessarily bare a true reflection on that presently. Much of the commentary provided in ‘The History of the Muslim Brotherhood’ report is historic and pursue a single, distorted narrative looking to advance a notion of ‘collective responsibility’.

43. This report has been independently commissioned, prepared at the request of The Cordoba Foundation, and one that seeks to examine the Muslim Brotherhood generally, and specifically from an Egyptian perspective without a pre-conceived agenda.
44. It is intended to add a balance to the position argued by the report prepared at the instruction of the State Litigation of Authority of Egypt, however, it does not seek to address each individual point raised by that report.

45. This report seeks to address the historical development of the Muslim Brotherhood, it seeks to address the issue of links with extremist organisations head on and thus undermine some of the myths that surround the Muslim Brotherhood specifically, and to an extent, Islam more generally.

46. Further, the report deals with the Muslim Brotherhood and its transition into a modern, recognised political party, namely the Freedom and Justice Party, and how the citizens of Egypt, who recently voted for an end to dictatorship, have seen the lights of democracy extinguished by a military autocracy, all in the name of the struggle against terror.

47. The reality of the position is that the Egyptian military, with the removal of former military leader Hosni Mubarak, saw that their grasp on power was likely to wain with a new administration.

48. No longer would they be able to influence and permeate every state institution, but they would have to revert to simply being ‘an army’ under the authority of an independent executive authority. The Brotherhood is not a threat. However, those that seek to criminalise a legitimate group purely for reasons of a personal and sinister agenda present such an immediate and apparent threat to democracy. With such actions, democracy is undermined, freedom of speech and expression curtailed, and those groups that promulgate extremism, see their numbers swelled through lack of an alternative.

49. That is the real threat, and the real issue to rally against.
Chapter 2: History and Ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood

i. History

50. The Muslim Brotherhood is a political, social and religious group founded in 1928 by the scholar Imam Hassan al-Banna.\(^1\) Currently, it is the world's oldest, largest and most influential Islamic organisation\(^2\).

51. During its long history, the Brotherhood has adapted to the varying political circumstances of Egypt.

52. In 1928, the area was almost completely controlled by the British government, which kept powerful advisors in the Egyptian government and army.\(^3\) The Brotherhood was founded, as many organisations at the time, with the intention to resist the British presence in the territory, which was “the focal point of Egyptian politics between the two world wars”.\(^4\)

53. What differentiated the Brotherhood from other groups is that it proposed resisting imperialism and social Westernisation through engendering an Islamic way of life and thinking:\(^5\) the Brotherhood suggested recovering the traditional Egyptian identity and values as a way to oppose foreign domination.

54. The foundation of the Brotherhood, and its school of political thought, was not a preconceived product or ideology, but the rational response to certain historical and social circumstances.

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\(^4\) Ibid.

55. It would be fair to say that the creation of the Islamist political ideology is, partly, a by-product of the Western Imperialism in the Arab region: the sudden import of European traditions and customs was perceived as a hazard to the traditional Islamic heritage of the region, a risk that not even the “Ulama”, the religious scholars, were able to prevent.

56. The principle of Political Islam surged at this time, as a tool to protect the identity of the Muslim world and the traditional values of its citizens. As a matter of fact, the Muslim Brotherhood is not the only Islamic movement that appeared in Egypt during the 1920s; the Young Muslim Men’s Society or YMMS (ash-Shubban al-Muslimun) was also established during the same period.

57. Therefore, it is clear, that Hassan al-Banna did not have the intention to implement a certain Islamist movement or a predetermined model of society, but to react to the modernisation and Westernisation trends that were re-shaping the Islamic way of life at the beginning of the 20th century. Unsurprisingly, the Brotherhood was founded in al-Ismailiyah, the home of the Suez Canal Company and of the largest British military barracks in Egypt -- a clear symbol of the British domination.

58. As it will be shown in this short historical account of the organisation, this lack of predetermination in the establishment of the Brotherhood explains why one of its main characteristics, and of Political Islam in general, is its great flexibility, its capacity to adapt to the historical momentum and evolve with the needs of the citizens.

59. Far from using violence to implement his ideas, Hassan al-Banna sought to promote an Islamic way of life through Tarbiyya (education and training), social activities, publications of newsletters, the organisation of mutual aid programs, the establishment of schools and mosques, and the democratic participation in public affairs.

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60. However, the Brotherhood, as many other Egyptian charitable organisations at the time, only started developing a political character in the late 1930s, when the abovementioned historical circumstances encouraged various social groups or communities to adopt a more political stance.

61. For some authors the fact that the Brotherhood associated the Islamic message with practical activities in the local community is a key factor in explaining the success of the organisation during the 1930s, when it could boast of more than three hundred branches and between 50,000 and 150,000 members. The organisation started to expand its activities and created branches outside Cairo and Egypt, eventually being able to claim a presence in every Muslim country and in different segments of society.

62. Despite its popular support, the Brotherhood has historically faced high levels of oppression. After all, its great influence always posed a threat to the ruling elites.

63. Throughout the two last centuries, thousands of Brothers have been imprisoned, tortured, killed or exiled for their mere political opinions or their membership or association with the group.

64. The first wave of repression came in 1948, when Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha ruled to dissolve the organisation.

65. In the context of the political tensions of the Second World War, al-Banna created the Secret Apparatus to oppose and resist against the British occupation,

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a secret armed wing, but one that was not under the direct command of the Muslim Brotherhood’s institutions – and later discontinued.

66. Moreover, al-Banna implemented the *structure of families*, a new system of organisation that eased the Brotherhood’s political participation and converted it into a serious alternative to the *Wafid* party. In 1945 al-Banna participated in the parliamentary elections, which were sadly characterised by massive electoral fraud.

67. After the end of the Second World War, Egypt fell into a situation of political chaos. There was a general call for the end of the British occupation at the same time that the King empowered those political parties closest to him. The government, lacking widespread popular legitimacy, started to use the Security Forces to maintain stability and control the situation, which increased the level of political violence in the country. Al-Banna suffered several attempts of assassination and a member of the Nationalist Party murdered Prime Minister Ahmad Māhir.

68. The tensions arose further when the Israeli-Palestinian War erupted. Already in 1936, the Brotherhood mobilised support of the Great Palestinian revolt, in the form of mass protests and the collection of donations. In 1948 several members of the Brotherhood directly participated in the battlefield as volunteers.

69. Provided with arms to fight in the Palestinian War, the Secret Apparatus started to undertake violent activities without the permission, or even the knowledge, of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Banna started to become extremely concerned about the increasing independence of the Apparatus and his lack of control over the group.

70. The tensions with the Egyptian government reached a peak in 1948: after the Egyptian authorities discovered a Jeep with explosives and several documents that linked the Secret Apparatus with the Muslim Brotherhood, Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha banned the MB.
71. All Brotherhood meetings were banned, its possessions seized, and over four thousand members were imprisoned, including some of its most relevant leaders. These excessive and arbitrary measures affected all members of the Brotherhood indiscriminately, despite the fact that the majority of its members were not related to the activities of the Secret Apparatus.

72. At this time, the banning of the Brotherhood was understood to be a measure encouraged and proposed by the British establishment, whose authority the Brotherhood fiercely and effectively opposed. After all, the Brotherhood was progressively becoming a powerful force in Egypt, a serious alternative to the system of government and a potential threat to the established status quo.

73. In this atmosphere of severe political oppression, a 23-year-old affiliate of the Secret Apparatus killed Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi. The Egyptian police assassinated al-Banna two months later, as an act of retaliation, despite the fact that he had publicly condemned and criticised the assassination of al-Nuqrashi, saying that the killers were “neither from the Brotherhood nor Muslims”.

74. The Brotherhood remained categorised a banned organisation until 1951, when a judicial decision recognised its legality and thus allowed it to resume its activities. In the same year, the Brotherhood elected Justice Hasan al-Hudaybi, a judge in the Supreme Court, as its new General Guide, a person who had openly admitted his opposition to the existence of the Secret Apparatus.

75. Despite this positive evolution, oppression continued during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s era.

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13 Idem, p. 489.
76. Nasser had been a member of the Secret Apparatus of the Brotherhood until the banning of the group. Yet, he recovered the contact with the Brotherhood in 1951, when he planned a coup d’état.

77. The *Free Officers* materialised that coup on 23rd July 1952, which came to be known as “Revolution Day”. The Muslim Brotherhood actively helped contain the British attempts to intervene and saw itself as an essential part of the Revolution.

78. However, the differences between the Brotherhood and the Officers soon started to become evident. They disagreed on important points such as the Agricultural Reform or the creation of the *Liberation Assembly* and the Brotherhood started to become an opposition force.

79. As a result, the Free Officers began to exploit the differences between the members of the Brotherhood and to marginalise al-Hudaybi, especially after he replaced the leadership of the Secret Apparatus and regained control over the whole organisation.

80. In 1954, after some university conflicts between supporters of the Brotherhood and of the *Liberation Assembly*, the Revolutionary Leadership Council banned the Brotherhood and arrested hundreds of its members, including al-Hudaybi. However, the resignation of Muhammad Najīb –head of the Revolution Leadership Council –, the increasing tensions between different factions of the *Free Officers*, the restoration of the parliamentary system and the massive protests on the streets, obliged Gamal Abdel Nasser to review his decision, re-legalise the Brotherhood and release its members.

81. Yet, this experience left a bitter taste in the mouths of most of the members of the Brotherhood. Al-Hudaybi decided to go underground, and the Muslim Brothers began to oppose the independence agreement between the revolutionary government and the British authorities.
82. Nasser began to order arbitrary arrests against members of the Brotherhood; however, it was the failed attempt to assassinate him that provided him with the perfect excuse to subjugate the Brotherhood and appear as a national hero.17

83. Even if it is not still clear that neither Muslim Brotherhood nor its Secret Apparatus were responsible for the attack, they were accused of preparing the assassination, so Nasser ordered the complete dissolution of the Brotherhood in 1954.

84. Thousands of Brotherhood members, who had been wholly unaware of any planned assassination attempt,18 were imprisoned, tortured, killed or interned in concentration camps (mu’taqalat)19 and their assets were confiscated.20 Some Brothers were so horrifically tortured that they lost their lives in the process.

85. This excessive and indiscriminate response, contrary to the most basic principles of international human rights law, almost resulted in the complete destruction of the Brotherhood,21 and took until 2013 to regain their legal status and legitimacy,22 a tactic to which parallels can be drawn with the manner in which the administration of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has sought to silence the voice of the people.

86. However, this sad chapter in the history of the Brotherhood resulted in being entirely counterproductive for Nasser’s regime as, in response to this unparalleled oppression, some members of the Brotherhood deserted the movement and

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18 Ibid.
resorted to militancy throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, several Brothers felt betrayed by Nasser and the Free Officers who, far from compensating the Brotherhood with administrative or political influence for their valuable contribution in the fight against the British troops, attempted to destroy the whole group.

87. The violent oppression and the political subjugation encouraged the appearance of radical Islamist groups inside and outside of the Brotherhood. In fact, its most prominent radical member, the theorist Sayyid Qutb, only began to promulgate his teachings during his time in prison under Nasser’s regime.

88. In 1949 Sayyid Qutb published *Social Justice in Islam*, a work in which he critiqued the huge class differences in Egypt and built an Islamic concept of social justice. This book was well received by the Muslim Brotherhood and gave Qutb wide recognition.

89. Qutb became advisor to the Revolutionary Leadership Council after the 1952 Revolution. However, he lost faith in the Free Officers and joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1953.

90. Qutb supported the Brotherhood in its confrontations with Nasser’s regime and was imprisoned after the failed attempt of assassination, which he believed to be a conspiracy against the Brotherhood.

91. In the context of violent oppression, increasing State control over the social life and marginalisation of the Islamic culture, Qutb felt progressively detached from the Regime; however, his definitive radical transformation took place during his time in prison, where he witnessed the massacre of 23 Muslim Brothers who were protesting against the prison authorities.

92. This experience left a deep mark on Qutb and it is essential to understand why he published his work *Milestones* the same year he was released from prison.

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93. In *Milestones* Qutb proposed the theory of *hakimiya* (Rule of God on Earth), where Allah is conceived as the source of legislation, and ruler and driver of affairs; and although he did not expressly advocate *Takfir* (the excommunication of non-doctrinally pure Muslims), it was the logic consequence of his work.

94. Qutb’s execution in 1966 converted him in a martyr, popularised his authority and was precisely what encouraged a *Takfiri*st reading of *Milestones*.

95. Judge Hasan al-Hudaybi, who was arrested and sent to prison in 1965, provided the strongest refutation to Qutb’s theories in “*Preachers, Not Judges*”, which rejected *hakimiya* as a Qur’anic concept and opposed *Takfir*. Al-Hudaybi’s tolerant and peaceful view prevailed in the Brotherhood, “cementing the group’s moderate vocation”. *Preachers not Judges* prevented the Muslim Brothers from falling into extremism and brought their popularity back.

96. As a matter of fact, the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood officially rejected Qutb’s ideology in 1969. According to Abd al-Mon`im Abu ‘l-Futuh, then a member of the Guidance Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood:

> “Sayyid Qutb is an Islamic thinker whom we respect, but neither an ideological nor an operational reference for us. There is a huge gap between the thought of Hassan al-Banna and that of Qutb. Our ideological references are the writings of al-Banna and all documents produced by the Society since then”.  

97. However, Qutb’s teachings constituted “the key link and point of divergence between the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood and its more radical cousins”. Despite al-Hudaybi’s efforts and the criticism that these extremist groups received from religious

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scholars linked with the Brotherhood,\textsuperscript{29} they could not avoid the radicalisation of some of its members who, after suffering the harsh persecution of Nasser’s government, stopped believing in peaceful participation.\textsuperscript{30}

98. The notion of Takfir rapidly expanded amongst thousands of Islamists that were suffering arbitrarily arrest and torture in the Egyptian prisons. They began to consider that the Brotherhood's strategy of “gradualism” and non-violent advocacy was a failure.\textsuperscript{31}

99. These radicals, having lost the internal struggle for the Brotherhood, splintered off from the organisation and regrouped outside it during the 1970s.\textsuperscript{32} Some even left Egypt and fled to Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{33}

100. From 1970, President Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s successor, took a more conciliatory approach to the Brotherhood. The President allowed the Brotherhood to undertake its activities and even started developing a religious public image as Believing President.

101. It is noteworthy that following the military defeat of the 1967 war against Israel, Egypt witnessed an Islamic revival: students of Islam guided the students’ protests and actively participated in the Student Unions; and some of the main newspapers in Egypt started to include religious sections to discuss Islamic trends and developments.

102. Therefore, Sadat needed the support of the Brotherhood to face the opposition from Nasserist, Marxist, and nationalist parties\textsuperscript{34} and gain further public


\textsuperscript{34} Aknur, M. (2013): “The Muslim Brotherhood in Politics in Egypt: From Moderation to Authoritarianism?”, Review of International Law and Politics (Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika), Issue 33, p. 7-8;
support. He released and amnestied hundreds of the Brotherhood’s political prisoners— including Hasan al-Hudaybi—, increased the number of mosques and promised to integrate Islam in politics.\textsuperscript{36}

103. Despite lacking the status of a political party, the Brotherhood was able to reorganise and develop.

104. Indeed, during the 1970s, the organisation completely renounced violence,\textsuperscript{37} which represents the second major development of the history of the organisation after its creation in the 1920s. The Brothers committed to peaceful political participation across all levels of civil society, desisted from violently fighting against the State and thus confirmed their separation from Islamic extremist groups.\textsuperscript{38} According to Harnisch and Mecham, “the leaders of the Brotherhood, including General Guide Hasan Isma’il al-Houdaiby (1951–73), often expressed their desire to achieve the movement’s goals gradually and legally”.\textsuperscript{39}

105. Following this period is the renowned “second generation” of Brothers: pragmatic realists who, “with a high degree of professionalism and skill”, support participation in the democratic process to integrate the organisation into the Egyptian political life and change the system from within.\textsuperscript{40}

106. The Brotherhood re-started its propagation activities with the publication \textit{al-Da’wah}, a magazine that encouraged intellectual Islamic discussions and divulged

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\\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.


moderate, peaceful and rational Islamic thought, as opposed to the radical proposals of the Islamist extremist groups that had proliferated at the time.

107. However, like in Nasser’s era, the positive relationship between the Brotherhood and President Sadat was short-lived. As soon as the Brotherhood started criticising the 1978 peace agreement with Israel, Sadat’s support for the Shah of Iran, and his Western liberal economic policies, they became a political threat to the regime.41

108. Consequently, President Anwar Sadat embarked on a further campaign of oppression against the Brotherhood42 and came to be known as “the Pharaoh” among Islamic groups.43

109. He reversed all the abovementioned measures, promoted a purely secular State and impeded the Brotherhood participation in the elections.44 Some authors argue that the President had completely lost his grip on reality: Sadat ordered the arrest of more than 1500 political opponents, including several Islamist thinkers and members of the Brotherhood.

110. Sadat’s regime ended with the assassination of its President in October 1981 during a military parade to commemorate the 1973 victory. The Islamists groups Jama’a Islamia (Islamic group) and Jama’a Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) were responsible for the crime,45 which they considered the first step towards the Revolution and the establishment of an Islamic State.

111. These Jihadist or Takfirist Islamist groups, created after Nasser’s policy of oppression, orchestrated a series of violent actions during the following decade

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44 Ibid.

that sowed reckless violence in Egypt. This Islamist violence, worsened by the excessive response from the State security apparatus, shaped Egyptian politics and society for decades, bringing more tyranny and divisions between Muslim citizens.

112. The arrival of Hosni Mubarak to power after Sadat’s assassination provided a period of stability to the Brotherhood. Mubarak, who needed political and international legitimacy,\(^{46}\) established a system of “controlled democracy”.\(^{47}\) He called for democratic elections in 1984, in which the Brotherhood was able to participate for the first time in the history of the organisation.\(^{48}\)

113. Although the Brotherhood was still, officially, a banned group, Mubarak’s regime implemented a policy of toleration and permitted the Brothers to form a coalition with the Wafd party\(^{49}\) in 1984 (“Egypt’s most secular and liberal political party at the time”),\(^{50}\) and with the Labour Party and the Free Liberals Party in 1987,\(^{51}\) which is a clear sign of the Brotherhood’s great moderation and lack of sectarianism.

114. The coalition between the Brotherhood and the Wafd Party won 58 out of the 488 seats of the Egyptian Parliament\(^{52}\) and the coalition with the Labour Party, called “the Islamic Alliance”,\(^{53}\) obtained 60 seats “out of which 37 were occupied

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by Muslim Brothers”. These were significant results for the Brotherhood, an unofficial organisation that until recently had suffered severe oppression and had been forced underground. The participation in the elections and the electoral process permitted the Brotherhood to gain legitimacy and differentiate itself from the extremist Islamic groups. As a matter of fact, it was the first time in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood that some of its members could participate in the Egyptian People’s Assembly, which marks a milestone in the Brotherhood’s trajectory and reflects its de facto late entry into political life.

Moreover, the Brotherhood started to participate in all branches of civil society, including trade unions, and student organisations or professional associations, thus again confirming its legitimacy and commitment to democracy and thereby granting the Brothers a significant basis of popular support. They also organised systems to provide education and health to Egyptians citizens in need and even “managed to get into the lawyers’ syndicate, which was considered as the vanguard of Egyptian secularism”.

Academic experts defend the principles that the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in every level of civil society has positive long-term effects, such as “providing political education, carving out more freedom to manoeuvre to civil society vis-à-vis the state, fostering activism of secular groups […] and, with the regular attendance of the

54 Ibid.

55 An electoral process that is of course entirely discredited given the approach adopted by the Mubarak regime, however, the real issue is the willingness of the Brotherhood to engage in such a process, not whether that process was legitimate or otherwise.


59 Ibid, p. 16.

Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc, forcing the ruling party ‘to have 100 people in the Parliament at all times to maintain their majority’.”

However, the tacit toleration from Mubarak’s regime and the period of stability ended in 1990, when the Brotherhood boycotted the elections so as to protest for the Regime’s refusal to cancel the Emergency Law and implement political reforms and for the approval of the new Law 206.

This law reformed the electoral system in a way that threatened the democratic system and guaranteed an overwhelming victory of Mubarak’s party. After almost 10 years in power, Mubarak no longer needed to legitimise its rule, or respect the political opposition, and specifically the Brotherhood, which began to challenge its authority and become a political threat.

Egyptian authorities responded to the boycott, and to the Brotherhood’s refusal to support Mubarak for a third term, with political restrictions and a new wave of persecution and police oppression. This episode of political violence completed the historical cycle of support-criticism-oppression that has traditionally marked the relationship between the Brotherhood and the authoritarian regimes of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak.

In the 1990s, “the Brotherhood as well as other opposition forces such as the legal political parties and human rights NGOs became excluded from political dialogue”.

Moreover, in the 1990s, the tensions between the State and the extremist Islamists groups burst once again. These violent attacks provided Egyptian security forces with the perfect excuse to target the Brotherhood, although the organisation was not even remotely involved in the violent acts. Some of the Brotherhood’s leaders were arrested, al-Da’wah magazine was forced to shut-

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63 *Ibid*

64 *Ibid*

down and several Brothers were accused of planning to infiltrate the trade unions and revive a banned organisation.

122. The Brothers responded to these attacks with the third major development in their history: the publication, in 1994, of two documents that explained their political vision and their position on women.

123. The Muslim Brotherhood is an organisation born out of the social necessity to give a response to the particular historical circumstances that Egypt was living at the beginning of the 20th century. Therefore, the organisation did not have a preconceived path to follow, which forced the group to progressively evolve and adapt to the changing political scenarios. This is why, despite its influence and popularity, the Brotherhood’s political position towards certain essential topics, such as parliamentary democracy, was not clear. The political circumstances had dramatically changed since al-Banna’s time, and the participation in formal politics required the Brotherhood to specify its political thought and respond to the citizens’ aspirations.

124. The 1995 elections were marked by electoral corruption and a bloody episode of violence in which dozens were killed and hundreds injured by Egyptian security forces. The only candidate of the Brotherhood elected was later disqualified for “membership of a banned organisation” and any intent to legalise the party was rejected by the Government.66 In 2000 and 2005 elections, more than 1,600 and 800 Brothers were detained, respectively.67

125. Despite this political persecution, the electoral irregularities,68 the large-scale beatings,69 the arbitrary arrests,70 the detentions without charges of the Brothers,71

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66 Idem, p. 12.
67 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
who were often judged by military court trials,\textsuperscript{72} and the unofficial nature of the Brotherhood,\textsuperscript{73} which continued being a banned political organisation, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to maintain its position as the primary “party” in opposition.\textsuperscript{74} As a matter of fact, in 2005 the Brotherhood won 88 seats in Parliament\textsuperscript{75} and started to be considered as “Egypt’s only operating political party”\textsuperscript{76}: a group committed to democracy, and a clear alternative to Mubarak’s authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{77}

126. These 88 seats represent less than a fifth of the 454-seats parliament, and the National Party won more than a two-thirds majority, enough to make constitutional reforms. Nevertheless, this election showed a change in Egyptian politics, confirmed the great political muscle of the Muslim Brotherhood and put in evidence the clear necessity to improve the Egyptian political and democratic system. After all, the Muslim Brotherhood, the main force in the opposition, continued being an illegal banned organisation.

127. The higher level of transparency could explain this unprecedented electoral success. Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States were placing pressure on Arab


\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
countries to liberalise; so Jamal Mubarak, the President’s son, had made attempts to rebuild the National Party and make political reforms. Moreover, the Kifayah (Enough) movement organised protests in 2004 to call for pluralistic democratic reform. The Brotherhood joined these protests and organised other demonstrations, to which the Mubarak regime responded with a new arrest campaign.

128. This unexpected electoral success of the Brotherhood was the trigger to increase the level of oppression further. Between 2006 and 2008 the Brotherhood suffered one of the worst episodes of arrests in the history of the organisation.\(^78\) The Egyptian government began a ‘smear campaign’ against the Muslim Brotherhood,\(^79\) revoked the licenses of some of the Brothers’ businesses\(^80\) and close several newspapers and other media outlets so as to erase the ability to report and highlight criticisms of the regime, thus deeply curtailed freedom of expression in the country.\(^81\)

129. Moreover, in 2007 Mubarak promoted a constitutional reform that banned “any political activity [...] within any religious frame of reference” and limited the possibility for independent candidates to run for the national and local elections;\(^82\) this curtailed tremendously, the capacity of the Brotherhood to participate in the political process, and further highlighted the move away from democracy to authoritarianism that underlined the Mubarak regime.


130. Again, before 2010 elections, Egyptian forces embarked upon a campaign of massive arrests of Muslim Brothers, resulting in the group boycotting the elections. Consequently, Mubarak’s party, the NDP won the majority of seats in the Parliament, confirming the tyrannical rule of the Egyptian military.

131. The history of Egypt during the 20th century is marked by violent foreign domination, democratic deficit, oppressive and despotic ruling elites, the expansion of State power and of the role of the security forces. This context is what determined the emergence and the evolution of Political Islam, and particularly, of the Muslim Brotherhood.

132. This organisation speaks a political language adapted to the values, convictions and needs of the Muslim citizens, creating a political trend specific to their historical circumstances and their traditional mind-set. The Brotherhood speaks the words of pluralism and democracy, of Islam and independence. It opposes the contemporary decline of the region, the authoritarian character and the foreign dependence of the military regimes and defends an Islamic identity and a Muslim unity. This message has provided them widespread popularity, which the ruling elites perceived as a dangerous threat.

133. Mubarak’s ousting of power in 2011, by a popular youth movement that organised multitudinous protests in Egypt, gave the Brotherhood the opportunity to participate in the elections on equal terms with other political parties for the first time since the foundation of the organisation. In fact, in 2013 the Brothers were officially registered as a civil society association (after 60 years of negated legal legitimacy), formed a political party and won the first democratic elections in Egyptian history.

84 Idem, p. 13.
**ii. Non-violent nature**

134. This short analysis of the history of the Muslim Brotherhood highlights two facts: first, that it has been a historically oppressed organisation in Egypt for posing a political threat to the 20th-century authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments. Thousands of Brothers have systematically been arbitrarily arrested, tortured and killed for their membership of the group, and the inherent rights of freedom of expression and association have been severely curtailed. This oppression has left a lasting effect on the nature of the organisation, having been forced underground, and helps explain the cautious behaviour of the oldest members of the group.

135. Second, this historical analysis also evinces that the Brotherhood has consistently showed respect for democracy and commitment to peaceful participation in the social and political life of the Egyptian nation, particularly after the Nasserite era. Specifically, the severe waves of oppression that the Muslim Brotherhood suffered are responsible for encouraging “moderate Brotherhood members to avoid resorting themselves to harsh expression, violence, and coercion”. Indeed, of the Muslim Brotherhood’s moderation there is a great consensus in the academia.

136. The only situations in which the Muslim Brotherhood or, more correctly, some of its members, have resorted to violence were during periods of highly violent political oppression or in the context of the fight against the yoke of

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colonialism. This is not only consistent with Western values but also a right under certain constitutions and international human rights treaties.\(^8^9\)

137. In fact, currently, the Brotherhood continues authorising resistance and violence “in countries and territories occupied by a foreign power”, which constitutes the Muslim version of the theory of “just war” from the Christian tradition.\(^9^0\)

138. According to Monier and Ranko, the Brotherhood finds three sources to legitimate the use of violence against colonialism, foreign domination or occupation: “the teachings of Islam, which can be interpreted to prescribe warfare (jihad) in the event of an attack carried out on Muslim territory; international laws and agreements, which protect a nation’s sovereignty over its territory and the right of defence; and the will of the people in support of armed resistance”.\(^9^1\)

139. The Secret Apparatus, the only violent movement that has been directly related to the Muslim Brotherhood, appeared on the 1940s, at the same time that the Young Egypt's Greenshirts, the Wafd's Blueshirts, the Nazi Brown shirts, and other paramilitary organisations were created in the Middle East,\(^9^2\) which shows that this kind of groups were characteristic of a certain period of time, prior to the Second World War and the establishment of international systems of human rights.

140. Given its violent character, Hassan al-Hudaybi challenged the existence of the Secret Apparatus. He committed to peaceful and democratic participation in public affairs and continued fighting for a change in Egyptian society “non-violently

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\(^9^1\) Monier, E. I. and Ranko, A. (2013): “The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood: implications For Egypt”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, No. 4, p. 113

through consciousness-raising of the Muslim masses and advice to ‘Muslim’ rulers’.\textsuperscript{93} The Brotherhood definitively dismantled the Secret Apparatus after Nasser’s rule.\textsuperscript{94}

141. The killings committed by Secret Apparatus or by some individual members of the Brotherhood, in name of the whole organisation only brought suffering and repression for the rest of the group. That is why al-Hudaybi and al-Banna always condemned and rejected their violent attacks.

142. The Brotherhood has been characterised by its choice of moderation and peaceful participation in public affairs, which is precisely what differentiates them from the more radical Salafists\textsuperscript{95} and other reprehensible terrorist Islamist groups that opted for violent means to implement their political aims.\textsuperscript{96} In fact, the Brotherhood has traditionally received severe criticisms from these extremist groups for its peaceful and democratic way to defend its vision of society.\textsuperscript{97}

143. According to Aknur, for the Muslim Brotherhood, “resorting to violence is counterproductive and unhelpful to the process of Islamisation, which would merely confirm the stereotypes about Islamists as fanatics who resort to terror, and give authoritarian regimes the excuse to continue their repression”.\textsuperscript{98}

144. Therefore, the defining characteristic of the Muslim Brotherhood is precisely its moderation, its decision to peacefully respect democracy and play by the parliamentary rules to incorporate Islam to the political order: “they make gradual changes at the grassroots level through peaceful and democratic means”.\textsuperscript{99}


\textsuperscript{96} Idem p. 518.


\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
According to el-Fotouh:

“For Muslims, ideological differences with others are taught not to be the root cause of violence and bloodshed because a human being’s freedom to decide how to lead his or her personal life is an inviolable right found in basic Islamic tenets, as well as Western tradition”.

Even during the protests against Mubarak, the Egyptian Brotherhood publicly called upon its members for “non-violent resistance” to the regime’s oppression. It added that their “old and new experiences confirm that non-violent resistance (almuqawama al-silmiiyya) is the most successful, quickest and less life-costly way to counter coups d’état and tyranny”. It explains why the Muslim Brotherhood, “fearing a confrontation with security forces” did not officially participate in the protests, although some of its members collaborated on an individual basis, until much later.

The Brotherhood participants in the demonstrations followed the non-violent means of protest proposed by secularists groups, including sit-ins, marches and civil disobedience. However, the Guidance Bureau, the majority of whose members had suffered the consequences from previous waves of governmental repression, criticised even those confrontational non-violent activities. The oldest members of the Brotherhood insisted on focusing on missionary and educational work “because the Egyptian regime was repressive and clashing with it would be useless”.

According to Leiken and Brooke, the Brotherhood uses education and organisational discipline to fight against the extremism and violence that could appear among its members. The Brothers tend to channel those violent and fanatic ideas to democratic politics, intellectual discussion and charitable

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103 Idem, p. 541.

104 Idem, p. 542.

activities, and where there is an instance of one of its members expressing the desire to use violent means, “he generally leaves the organisation to do so”. It could explain why the Egyptian Nobel laureate Mohamed ElBaradei told in an interview that the members of the Muslim Brotherhood are “in no way extremists”.

iii. Democratic participation in politics

149. Far from expanding their ideas by force, the Brotherhood has respected, participated in and even defended the democratic processes of the countries in which it is present. Its leadership has consistently called for freedom and democratic elections to substitute Egyptian tyrannical rule and has attempted to participate in the Egyptian elections for more than three decades. Indeed, when the Arab Spring started in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood called upon the Egyptian government to “hold free and fair parliamentary elections” to avoid the same kind of protests in Cairo.

150. The Brotherhood occupies a place in the conservative political spectrum and maintains their religiously motivated political positions from their parliamentarian seats, as several Christian parties do in different European parliaments. According to el-Fotouh:

“We seek to share in the debate sweeping the country and to be part of the resolution, which we hope will culminate in a democratic form of government. Egyptians want freedom from tyranny, a democratic process and an all-inclusive dialogue to determine our national goals and our future

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110 Idem, p. 11.

[...] the Brotherhood is just one group among a diverse array of growing political factions and trends in Egypt, soon to compete with mutual respect in fair and free elections. We have participated in the "political process" such as it was under Mubarak's dictatorship. In the decades of his rule, we have embraced diversity and democratic values. In keeping with Egypt's pluralistic society, we have demonstrated moderation in our agenda and have responsibly carried out our duties to our electoral base and Egyptians at large".  

151. After their struggle to survive in dictatorial regimes, democracy is the safest system for Muslim Brothers to operate, develop its activities and convince their neighbours about the advantages of an Islamic political regime. The Brotherhood defends that its aim of slow Islamisation of society is completely compatible with democracy. “the umma [the Muslim community] is the source of sulta [political authority]”. In fact, the Brothers are confident that Egyptian society would freely vote for Islamic leaders in the ballot box as an expression of the popular will to stop dictatorial power and the submission of Egyptian politics to the interests of foreign countries; but, they will respect the umma if it does not support them in democratic elections.

152. This explains why, in the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood founded a political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), to participate in the parliamentary elections. It was made open to all Egyptians, irrespectively of their gender or religion, a clear signal of the toleration and


openness of the Muslim Brotherhood. As a matter of fact, Rafi Habit, a Coptic Christian, was appointed vice-president of the political party,118 and the FJP started to negotiate with liberal parties to find common grounds to collude in the elections.119

153. The results of the elections were very favourable to the FJP, which received 37.5% of the votes and won 44.9 per cent of the parliament seats.120 This is of even greater importance when we consider that this was the first time in which the Muslim Brotherhood could participate in a fully democratic election with an accepted legitimate political party, and in the same conditions as the rest of the parties.

iv. Ideology

154. The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood is reminiscent of the early Reformists, such as Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. The majority of early Islamist Reformists came from the ‘Ulama Class and engaged in society through civil organisations, scholarly institutions and the issuing of publications, although they avoided participation in formal politics.

155. These individuals lived during decades falling between the 19th and the 20th centuries, a period of increasing Western influence on the area and of progressive modernization; a modernization that sought the creation of a powerful state, the homogenization of the citizens to create a single nation and the state centralist determination of education, legislation and jurisprudence.

156. The early Reformists represented the middle ground between those who completely rejected this process of modernisation and those who supported and encouraged it. On the one hand, they opposed colonialism and foreign domination; but on the other hand, they believed in internal reform, in the

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reinterpretation of Islamic values through a critical perspective and in the unity between Muslims.

157. The early reformists provided the first philosophical justification for the current of Political Islam, of which the Brotherhood is the greatest representative. For example, they created the theoretical correspondences between the concepts of Shūra (Consultation) and parliamentary representation; or between Ijmā (Consensus) and public opinion. However, most importantly, the early Reformists were the first ones to propose that Islam could constitute a response to modernity, which is an essential concept in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.

158. The ideology of the Brotherhood continued developing since the era of the Early Reformists. The group not only had to survive periods of harsh oppression, but also adapt to the new historical circumstances, including the fall of the Berlin Wall, the rise of Jihadist extremist groups, the increasing social differences or the expansion of democratic values and human rights.

159. The Brotherhood currently defends a conception of peaceful political Islam. They support traditional Islamic values through the engagement in pluralistic democratic processes and implementation of progressive reforms. Moreover, the political Islamists support the concepts of citizenship and human rights and the transparency and accountability of State Power.

160. While the early Reformists' proposals help explain the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood; the current ideology of the Brotherhood comes influenced by Neo-Reformist scholars such as al-Qaradawi, who helped create the new Islamic Reformist School.

161. These scholars admit the legitimacy of the modern nation state whilst calling for increasing cooperation between Muslim countries; moreover, they all reject political violence whilst defending the reformation of policies to implement Islamic values. The Neo-Reformists pursued the reconciliation between the Islamists and the modern state, and between the Islamic countries and the International community. They support democracy, pluralism and the accountability of political institutions, as the Shari’a’s values of freedom and
human dignity can only be achieved in a democratic society. For them, the Muslim community is the source of the political authority.\textsuperscript{121}

162. The Neo-Reformists provided new theoretical legitimacy to the proposals of the Political Islam and their influence is clear on the Muslim Brotherhood.

163. However, in order to understand the political success of the organisation, it is necessary to take into account the historical context and the evolution of the different proposals that sought to change the role of the Arab community in the World.

164. In the 1950s, Nasser defended a “Pan-Arab” model: a single Arab nation, led by Egypt, that could counterbalance the influence and power of Western countries in the region. Mubarak’s era rejected this pan-Arabism and proposed a model of semi-democratic nation-states controlled by the military. The priority was to preserve the national sovereignty of these states and develop an Arab secular nationalism. An Egyptian leadership, again, would ensure the stability of the region.

165. However, the military dominance of Israel, the lack of independent foreign policy, the Western military invasion of Muslim countries,\textsuperscript{122} and the oppressive nature of the Egyptian (semi-) authoritarian regimes, coupled with the previous failure of Marxist theories in the region, started to make way for Islamic proposals.\textsuperscript{123}


166. The Brotherhood opposed Mubarak’s authoritarian model and his vision of national sovereignty and pure secularism\textsuperscript{124} and offered a new model not only for Egypt, but also for the entire Arab World. The Brothers proposed the theory of Pan-Islamism: a “new nationalism framed in terms of religion, heritage and identity”\textsuperscript{125} that could lead to the establishment of a “Caliphate”,\textsuperscript{126} a political union of Muslim citizens based on Islamic values.\textsuperscript{127} This Caliphate would not be a theocracy, but “a civil state with an Islamic reference”,\textsuperscript{128} just as the European Union is based on Judeo-Christian references, principles and roots.

167. After all, Islam is not only an ancient religion shared by more than a billion people, but also a universal philosophical system that offers an particular vision of the society, the economy, the law, the family and the individual.

168. The Brotherhood, as many other political movements in the Muslim world, defends the existence of values and visions of life that derive from the Islamic culture and that are different from the Western world. In order to defend and confirm the Islamic identity, al-Banna, since the foundation of the organisation, opposed the British presence in the territory and the Westernisation of the Egyptian society,\textsuperscript{129} which brought to the country values that were unfit to Egyptian culture, such as materialism or capitalism, which constituted a new form of cultural colonialism.\textsuperscript{130}


\textsuperscript{125} Monier, E. I. and Ranko, A. (2013): “The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood: implications For Egypt”, \textit{Middle East Policy}, Vol. 20, No. 4, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{126} There is no comparison between the Caliphate proposed by the Brotherhood, and that which is espoused by extremist groups, in particular the Islamic State in Iraq and in Syria.


169. The objective of the Brotherhood is to create a cohesive community of Muslim citizens that could work together to defend their own interests,\textsuperscript{131} end the subjection of the Islamic World to the domination of Western powers,\textsuperscript{132} confirm their independence and build a common identity, with its emphasis based on the adaptation of the Islamic way of life.\textsuperscript{133}

170. What they propose is an alternative political model for the Muslim countries of the World, a new system to participate in international affairs, more suited to their values and vision of life. The Brotherhood seeks to defend the Islamic cultural particularities against the Western international cultural and political domination\textsuperscript{134}, deeply linked with the increasing expansion of Judeo-Christian concepts in International Law.

171. Just as there are proposals for alternative models to understand politics and society that come from Asian or South-American traditions, the Muslim Brotherhood aims to promote an Islamic cosmovision.

172. We must remind ourselves, that the concepts of sovereignty, nation-state and strict secularism are of a purely Western nature and alien to Islamic principles.\textsuperscript{135} Indeed, the concept of sovereignty was used in the 19th century to legally confirm, in International Public Law, the supremacy of the metropolis over the colonies.\textsuperscript{136}

173. In order to achieve this political community based on religious identity and common values, the Brotherhood proposes a progressive Islamisation of society; a gradual process that commences in the individual sphere and that expands to


\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{134} Idem, p. 114.


the family and to the whole society through education and social action. This process, according to the Brotherhood, must not be forced with the use of violence, but freely accepted by the citizens, who should be given the opportunity to vote for the incorporation of Islamic values into politics in free and democratic elections.

174. The Brotherhood confirmed its commitment towards democratic values and its belief in a system of public consultation in the two documents issued in 1994, that explained the organisation’s political vision and its position towards women.

175. The documents defended the necessity of a written constitution in conformity with Islamic values, the responsibility of rulers, the binding nature of the law emanated in parliament, the value of pluralism and political rotation, the accountability of the executive power towards the parliament; and the protection of public freedoms. The documents also recognised women’s right to work, hold public offices and be member of political assemblies, including the parliament. Their only limitation is the position of President.

176. The Brotherhood has a comprehensive ideology that includes proposals for a wide range of issues that encompass the everyday lives of Egyptian citizens to the creation of a grand political International Islamic community.

177. The Brotherhood has already provided some clues of the kind of Islamic society they envision. In such a society, Islamic values would be the main source of "state and societal identity and the main criteria for legislation". For the Brotherhood, a Egyptian Islamic society should have increased ties with other Arab countries, more social services and health institutions, better conditions for both agricultural and industrial workers, a minimum wage and, in general, a stronger


138 Ibid.


state that would forbid usury and create a moral economy.\textsuperscript{142} According to some commentators, given the moderation and normality of these proposals, the Muslim Brotherhood is not an ideological, but a political threat: they do not offer “a shining new vision of Islamic society or a radical return to ancient beliefs”\textsuperscript{143}

178. In fact, the Islamic political parties are, philosophically, modern groups in their conception of the State, of the economy and of the majority of political issues. Their call for the implementation of an Islamic rule, it is not a call for the retrieval of a certain historical past, but for the implementation of an alternative and modern Islamic vision of the sovereign State and of society.

179. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood, far from being a fanatical or an extremist group, is a moderate Islamic organisation with conservative or traditional values\textsuperscript{144} that has consistently attempted to defend them through the democratic processes\textsuperscript{145} and a peaceful involvement in Egyptian civil society:\textsuperscript{146}

”[The Muslim Brothers] called for an Islamic state and held that true Islam was essentially democratic and capable of solving the problems of the modern world […] Unlike many of the militant Islamic groups today, the Muslim Brotherhood did not hold a particularly radical ideology; it did not advocate a return to the glorious age of Islam or an insistence on a literal reading of holy texts; it did not profess ideas that were anti-modern or even anti-Western. On the whole, the organization’s message conformed to the popular understanding of religion and the prescriptions of established religious scholars who worked under the authority of the state”\textsuperscript{147}

180. With the passing of time the Brotherhood has become a powerful and influential political movement linked to the fight against corruption, the protection of sovereignty against foreign interference, the protection of traditional values, the


\textsuperscript{143} Idem, p. 505.

\textsuperscript{144} Idem, p. 490.


\textsuperscript{147} Idem, p. 490 and 504.
popular mobilisation against authoritarianism and even to the defence of grand causes.

181. However, the concept of Political Islam has not solely permeated the political life of the countries on which it is present, but perhaps most importantly, its cultural and philosophical life. The intellectual debates between Muslim intellectuals and writers, many of whom members of the Muslim Brotherhood, have greatly contributed to the Muslim culture in the last decades. As a matter of fact, some authors hold that Islamic political organisations, such as the Brotherhood, became the new spokesperson for Islam after the marginalisation of the ‘Ulama Class, which lost its authority and independence.

182. Moreover, the Islamic model proposed by the Brotherhood seems to perfectly fit the socio-political aims and preferences of Egyptian citizens. According a 2008 Gallup Poll, 98% of the Egyptian population said that religion plays an important role in their lives and 88% of respondents understood that Shari’a should be a source of legislation (64% considering that it should be the only source of legislation).

148 Furthermore, a 2011 Gallup survey shows that while Egyptians reject a theocracy, the majority of citizens “envison a representative government where religious principles guide the democratic process”.149

183. These preferences show that Egyptians are as attached to democracy as they are to religious values and traditions, which completely corresponds to the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology. This explains why in a 2011 survey from the Pew Research Centre, 75% of the Egyptian respondents agreed to have a favourable or very favourable opinion of the Muslim Brothers.150


184. We must remind ourselves that, unlike Europe, Muslim societies did not suffer a confrontation between the community and the religious authorities that could encourage citizens to reject their Islamic values and references. The marginalization of the Islamic authority far from responding to internal processes, came from foreign forces and pressures, which explains why Islam remains strong in Muslim societies.

185. Despite some Western politicians and journalists continuing to hold an anti-Islamist rhetoric and seeking to portray the Brotherhood as a radical violent group related to Islamist terrorism, the truth is that the Brotherhood has maintained this spirit of moderation since the beginning of its history.

186. This moderation is what encouraged some academics and authors to call upon Western countries to collaborate with the Muslim Brotherhood after the protests of the Arab Spring:

“Having ignored and isolated these groups for years, European countries should now see them as initiators of the biggest Arab political parties of the future. A valid attitude seems to include attempting to establish a dialogue and political contacts (including those at the party-to-party level), especially with the Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt and Jordan”.

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Chapter 3: Organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood

187. The Muslim Brotherhood follows a complex hierarchy. At the lowest level there are families of approximately five people (usra). The members of each family have weekly meetings and pay a monthly contribution to the organisation depending on their income.\textsuperscript{152}

188. Various families in the same geographical region form a section, and the sections from the same governorate elect a Shura Council. Each of the 27 Shura Councils at the governorate level sends representatives to the national Shura Council, the legislative body of the Egyptian Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{153}

189. This Council, composed by 118 representatives that are appointed for a six-year term, selects 17 of its members to conform the Guidance Bureau, the executive organ of the Brotherhood and the institution at the top of the pyramidal structure of the organisation. The Supreme Guide, who is elected for a six-year term, with the possibility to be re-elected for a second term, leads this Bureau. Mohammed Badie, the current Supreme Guide (al-Mursid al-‘Aam), is the eighth one since the foundation of the Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{154}

190. It is estimated that the Egyptian Brotherhood has between 100,000 and 500,000 members.\textsuperscript{155} It has always been difficult to obtain exact data on the number of Muslim Brothers because there are three degrees of membership, depending on the level of commitment and involvement with the organisation. According to Munson, there are assistants, who sign a membership card and make financial contributions to the organisation; related members, who attend meetings, study the Brotherhood’s values and principles and swear obedience to the group; and finally active members, whose lives are totally immersed within the Muslim


\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
Brotherhood: “including high achievement in Qur’anic learning, observance of all Islamic obligations, and regular physical training”.156

191. The complexity of the Brotherhood’s organisation increases when we take into account that each governorate has administrative offices to manage local student groups, health and educative institutions, the Brotherhood’s social services and its participation in unions and professional associations,157 including the professional syndicates of lawyers, doctors, engineers, and journalists.158

192. The Brotherhood is more than a political entity. As mentioned above, its political aspirations and participation started almost a decade after the foundation of the organisation. That is the reason why some authors define the brotherhood as a “mosaic of social, political and religious networks”.159 Others highlight that the Muslim Brothers could be considered “a Salafiyah message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organisation, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company and a social idea”,160 all at the same time.

193. The aim has always been to strengthen community life and the ties between neighbours. This communitarian approach, was developed as a response to the increasing individualism of the Western modernisation, urbanisation and industrialisation brought to Egypt in the 20th century.161 The Muslim Brotherhood sought to recover the traditional structures of social life, original from the Egyptian and Islamic culture, and started providing alternative social services,162 which increased its popularity and re-drew “the boundaries between state

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and society”.

According to Caromba and Solomon, “Egypt is plagued by numerous social needs that the government is either unable or unwilling to fulfil, allowing the Brotherhood to fill the gaps left by the state”.

194. The Brotherhood built schools to improve levels of literacy, implemented welfare schemes, organised physical training groups and constructed mosques, and social clubs. Its defence of Islamic values through Tarbiyya (“education and training”) encouraged Muslim Brothers to not only build primary and secondary schools for both boys and girls, but to also create technical training institutions for adults and organise open lessons to study and interpret the Qur’an. The Brotherhood also opened several health clinics staffed with volunteers to decrease child mortality. These institutions provided health services of a better quality than state hospitals. Moreover, the Brotherhood promoted the creation of industrial and service businesses to give work opportunities to unemployed people, along with the implementation of systems of food provision for poor citizens. The Brotherhood’s institutional infrastructure was so big and important that authorities were obliged to maintain it after the dismantlement of the group during Nasser’s regime “for fear that their collapse would lead to widespread unrest”.


167 Ibidem, p. 15.

168 Ibidem.

195. This powerful social and economic infrastructure, combined with the organisation of the Brotherhood in regional and local branches,\(^{170}\) explains the rapid mobilisation of its members and its ability to resist and survive despite the violent waves of oppression that the Brothers suffered.\(^{171}\) Moreover, it also allowed the Brotherhood to demonstrate not only that they were effective providing services; but also, that another political model for Egypt was possible. According to some scholars, the Brothers who participated in trade unions fostered the transparency of these institutions and contributed to their fight against corruption and mismanagement, which broadened their popularity and leadership experience.\(^{172}\)

196. The Brotherhood has showed a clear flexibility when participating in the Egyptian political and social life. It has not only been present in trade unions and associations of different political affiliations; but also appealed “to the most diverse sectors of society”.\(^{173}\) Although it is true that the Brotherhood has traditionally been more successful among the most modern and educated segments of the Egyptian society,\(^{174}\) its influence expands through both rural and urban areas of Egypt.\(^{175}\)

197. However, at this point it is necessary to highlight that the Brotherhood’s influence is not limited to the territory of Egypt: it is present in the majority of countries in the Muslim world. Its proposal to reconcile Islam and democracy and its traditional support to the Palestinian territories, have granted the Muslim

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\(^{170}\) Idem, p. 498.


Brotherhood a great popularity in the Middle East and helped expand its influence.\textsuperscript{176}

198. Internationally, the Brotherhood has been defined as a “confederated alliance of social movements”\textsuperscript{177} or a “federated system of semi-autonomous branches, where leadership is decentralised”,\textsuperscript{178} meaning that the national groups of the Brotherhood have a great level of independence to make their own decisions and adapt to the social and political life of each country. Some experts have defended that the degree of autonomy of these national braches is so high that, at the international level, the Muslim Brotherhood organisation is “feeble”;\textsuperscript{179} the cooperation between different national branches of the Brotherhood is often reduced to “declaratory support of a given faction’s activities”.\textsuperscript{180} The truth, is that despite its long-term aspirations of Pan-Arabism, the Muslim Brotherhood is especially effective at the neighbourhood and community level, where the majority of its activities occur.\textsuperscript{181} This has led some authors to argue that the Brotherhood’s “international debility is a product of its local successes”.\textsuperscript{182}

199. Although all of the national branches of the Brotherhood share a common ideology and an ideal of Islamic society, their tactics to implement their political


\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.

aims vary depending on the political environment and the cultural specificities of the seventy countries in which the Brotherhood is present.\textsuperscript{183}

200. This explains why the political position or the degree of moderation of the Brotherhood differs from country to country.\textsuperscript{184} Leiken and Brooke give us an illustrative example of this fact: while the Egyptian Brotherhood has harshly criticised the United States for its close links with Israel, “the Syrian Brotherhood, meanwhile, keenly supports the Bush administration’s efforts to isolate the Assad regime”.\textsuperscript{185}

201. According to Munson, the federated organisation of the Brotherhood and even its structure in regional and local branches has been crucial to understand the social and political success of the Brotherhood. This structure encouraged members to develop sentiments of loyalty to both the specific branch to which he was affiliated, and thus better adapted to the particularities of the local or national political life; and to the Muslim Brotherhood organisation as a whole, with which the members share a basic ideology, valid for every context.\textsuperscript{186} But most importantly, the decentralized and federated structure of the organization permitted the Brothers to adapt and evolve with the circumstances that presented themselves, and integrate members with “a diversity of social beliefs and commitment”.\textsuperscript{187}

202. The Brotherhood is a highly heterogeneous group\textsuperscript{188} because its members come from completely diverse backgrounds. As analysed in Chapter 4, the ideological disparities between Brothers have shaped the history of the organization,


\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Idem}, p. 499.

\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Ibid.}
increased its flexibility and spirit of adaptation and contributed to the evolution of the group.

203. The history of the Brotherhood in the 1970s is characterised by the scission of extremist violent groups from the mother organisation, as they did not agree with the peaceful methods of the Brotherhood. However, other members have also left the mainstream organisation in order to create liberal or even more moderate groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood Without Violence and the Muslim Brotherhood Youth Movement. As a matter of fact, in the same time Qutb explained his teachings in prison; other moderate members of the Brotherhood, such as al-Hajj Abbas al-Sisi, were able to attract the attention of multitudes “with non-violent and more egalitarian Islamist ideas.”

204. These disparities continue being present nowadays, making it possible to identify different political factions or trends inside the Brotherhood, where we can see that while some members prefer moderate proposals, others defend more radical ideas.

205. Usually, the degree of radicalism or reformism of the Brotherhood members varies according to the generation they belong to and the level of oppression to which they have been subjected. In this sense, Khalil al-Anani identified four generations inside the Brotherhood. The most veteran members, born between 1930 and 1950, would constitute the first generation, and so receive the name of the Old Guards. These members, who bear the deepest “scars of repression and secrecy”, constitute the more conservative group and their main aim is to ensure the survival of the group, which therefore makes them cautious and “intellectually

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They tend to support the ideological activities and discourage the active participation in politics, as they consider them ineffective and dangerous for the future preservation of the group.

206. The second generation are the pragmatists, who began their adulthood during Sadat’s conciliatory 1970s, when the Brotherhood confirmed its purely peaceful approach to politics and differentiated itself from those terrorist radical groups that were active during the period. This group of professional and skilled politicians support the participation of the Brotherhood in the public affairs, in contrast to the opinion of the members form the third generation, the neo-traditionalists.

207. This group, who suffered the constant repression of Mubarak’s regime, is comprised of conservative members that opt for a low public and political profile.

208. The last generation is the youth, whose component members are currently in their 20s and 30s. These young moderate Brothers actively support the participation of the Brotherhood in the Egyptian political life and are open to reform.

209. During the last years, especially during the forced public clashes against Mubarak’s government, this group has been particularly active. It organised conferences to demand more transparency inside the organisation, more promotion opportunities for young and for female members of the Brotherhood, and a greater degree of openness towards the Egyptian society.

Although these disparities between members of the Brotherhood made it difficult to achieve a consensus, the spirit of the young for public participation won the ideological battle against the Old Guards’ cautiousness and, as mentioned above, the Brotherhood decided to participate in the first Egyptian democratic elections with a newly founded political party, the Freedom and

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Justice Party. This party is, again, characterised by its pluralistic nature, as is its mother organisation. Among its members it is possible to find from “moderate liberals to pragmatists and ideologues”, women and even Christians.

211. The leadership of the Brotherhood and the primacy of certain political factions is usually dependent on the particular political circumstances of Egypt: when the organisation has been forced underground, the most conservative members, with a lower faith in the official political system, have tended to be more powerful; in contrast, in the periods of peace and stability, the most open-minded Brothers have led the discourse of the organisation. This capacity of adaptation to the specific juncture has led some authors to argue that the Brotherhood plays “between the poetry of ideology and the prose of political reality.”

212. Despite sharing common values and principles, the Brotherhood is a deeply heterogeneous group, formed by members with a wide range of opinions. This heterogeneity has forced the Brotherhood to be more ideologically flexible and open to different interpretations of Islamic core concepts. It is also precisely the reason why the structure in more important than the individuality in the organization and the reason why the Muslim Brotherhood avoids the proliferation and prominence of strong personalities.

213. The international community and the media must always take the heterogeneity of the Brotherhood into account when approaching or reporting about the Muslim Brotherhood. Making general assumptions of the organisation from the statements of a single Brother or from the activities of a particular branch or group could give a completely biased image of the whole organisation. However, this is often the case of some Western media or organisations, which tend to tendentiously present the Brotherhood as an extremist or radical organisation.


200 Idem, p. 3.
basing its information on the conservative statements of some of its old or past members.\textsuperscript{201}

214. This is especially concerning because despite their different opinions, styles and preferences; despite the existence of factions; and despite the lack of internationalised central system of decision, there is a thing that unifies all the Muslim Brothers of the World: they “\textit{all reject global jihad while embracing elections and other features of democracy}”\textsuperscript{202}.


Chapter 4: Allegations of links to militancy and extremism

i. Introduction

215. Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s long-lasting history of participation in politics and respect for the democratic process, some authors and media have insisted on relating the organisation with Islamic terrorism.

216. This is fundamentally erroneous, as the Brotherhood has, since the 1970s, consistently endeavoured to differentiate itself from this kind of violent group, offering a peaceful alternative to defend Islamic values in a democratic society. The Brotherhood has participated in every sphere of civil society and expanded its message through education, intellectual discussion, community building and participation in the electoral processes, thus showing an on-going commitment to such principles.

217. The alleged links of the Brotherhood with terrorist groups are tenuous at best. In the main, these links are based on either the involvement of certain well-known terrorists within a particular branch of the Brotherhood during their youth – before starting their violent activities –; or on ideological similarities between both kinds of groups. The State Litigation Authority’s commissioned report seeks to allege that the Muslim Brotherhood has provided material support to terrorists networks, however, it must be concluded that the evidence in support of such a proposition is tenuous, and does not stand up to scrutiny.

218. This chapter seeks to analyse the alleged connections between the Brotherhood and the militant terrorist groups and prove their falsehood. Indeed, this chapter will expose the irreconcilable ideological differences between the Brotherhood and those militant groups that it is suggested espouse the same rhetoric and ideology; the reality of the position, is that they constitute incompatible alternatives for the formation of an Islamic society.
ii. Historical incompatibility: Muslim Brothers that left the organisation to establish militant Islamist groups.

219. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Islamic groups with terrorist motivations begun to proliferate in the 1970s precisely “in reaction to the Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to transform Egyptian society and government”. 203

220. After Nasser’s crackdown on the Brotherhood, some members decided to reject the peaceful mantra of the organisation in considering them useless and ineffective. They criticised the Brotherhood’s decision to participate in the elections and its accommodating attitude towards the State; they even labelled it as the “Bankrupt Brotherhood”. 204

221. Sayyid Qutb, a Muslim Brother hanged by the Nasserite government in 1965, is considered the “Godfather of Jihadism”. 205 During his time in prison, Qutb started to build a radical ideology which other Islamists took or interpreted as the basis for their radical, violent and extremist endeavours.

222. The mix of Qutb’s theoretical support with the violent oppression that Islamists suffered under Nasser’s rule created the perfect conditions for the proliferation of extremist groups.

223. For example, at that time, Shukri Mustafa founded the “Society of Anathemisation and Migration”. The group placed itself out of society, obliging its members to leave their jobs and families. 206 Moreover, Salih Sirriya founded the “Military Academy”, a violent group that attempted to violently overthrow Sadat’s regime. However, the attempt failed and Sirriya was executed in 1976. 207 Other Jihadist


207 Ibid.
some Muslim Brothers, angry about the severe oppression and disappointed with
the official political process, joined or created radical anti-systemic groups,
inspired by Qutb’s writings, started fighting for the violent implementation of an
Islamic state. They inaugurated what today is known as Salafi-jihadism.209

However, the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood at the time, Hassan al-
Hudaybi, opposed Qutb’s teachings in Preachers, not Judges. The Brotherhood
definitively rejected Qutb’s violent proposals and separated itself from the Salafi-

226. It is then, when the essential and historical separation between the two kinds of
groups occurs: according to Holtmann, “extremist ideological groups broke away from
the mother-faction and interpreted the ‘totalising’ Muslim Brotherhood core-concepts
violently, including the justification and perpetration of indiscriminate terrorism
against civilians”.210

227. Some of the Brotherhood’s members who decided to leave the organisation to
join a jihadi group were the al-Qaeda leaders Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama Bin

228. The former created his first underground cell in 1966 – when he was only 16
years old – and suffered imprisonment after President Sadat’s assassination.

229. Afterwards, his cell joined the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which was founded as a
response to the Brotherhood’s renouncement of violence in the early 1970s.211

The group, responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-

208 Idem, p. 520.
Sadat in 1981, merged with al-Qaeda in 1998, during Ayman al-Zawahiri’s leadership. It is argued that al-Zawahiri had lost confidence in the violent struggle in Egypt and started to blame Western countries for the strong power of the Arab ruling regimes. Therefore, he deemed it to be necessary to attack the Western World before establishing an Islamic system of governance. Ayman al-Zawahiri became al-Qaeda’s leader after the death of Osama bin Laden.  

Osama Bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam were members of the Brotherhood until the Hama massacre, which marked the collapse of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s insurrection against the Syrian regime. After the defeat, the Muslim Brothers decided to reject any violent fight and committed to peaceful participation in the political system as their only method to achieve social change.

Bin Laden and Azzam considered that this decision was “treacherous” and expanded their radical and anti-Brotherhood ideas in the Services Bureau at Peshawar, the cradle of al-Qaeda and the principal destination of Afghan jihadi fighters that wanted to participate in the Afghani Resistance Movement.

Although Azzam had already disagreed with the Jordanian branch of the Brotherhood, it was the Services Bureau, “a worldwide network to foster volunteering and financing on behalf of the Afghan cause” that gave Azzam and Bin-Laden the institutional and financial tools to leave the Muslim Brotherhood and create a separate salafi-jihadi organisation. It has to be noted however that Bin Laden and Azzam also fell out on ideological and strategy grounds.

Other former members of the Brotherhood that left the organisation to join Islamist terrorist groups are Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, emir of the Islamic State of Iraq; Mohammed Yusuf, founder of Boko Haram. Mohammed Yusuf left the

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215 Ibid.

216 Ibid, p. 19

234. It is however all too easy to simply see an individual and note the past involvement with the Brotherhood and therefore draw the erroneous conclusion that any radical ideas or extremist leanings that such an individual has, must therefore be reflective of the ideals of the Brotherhood, when the reality is that the opposite is the case.

235. The opposite is the case in that it is precisely because such ideals conflict with those of the Brotherhood, that such an individual has been forced to leave.

236. The use of violence by groups such as al-Qaeda has severely damaged the image of Islam across the world and created further divisions between Muslim populations. As a matter of fact, this violence has negatively affected the Muslim Brotherhood, as the group has historically been the collateral target of the State security apparatuses’ attacks against the extremists groups.

237. These are points however that are conveniently ignored by the majority of the media, and those individuals on the domestic and international stage that simply seek to promote a right-wing, anti-Islamic agenda.

238. The fact that these famous Islamist terrorists decided to leave the Muslim Brotherhood to start their violent activities, far from a constituting a proof of the supposed “connections” between both groups, is the confirmation of their differences, of the peaceful character of the Brotherhood and of its intolerance towards violence and fanaticism.

239. Given the age, the popularity and global nature of the Brotherhood, it is possible, and even expected, to find certain terrorists among their old ranks. However, all of them had to leave the organisation to start their violent activities.
240. They created or joined these violent organisations due to a profound disagreement with the essence of the Brotherhood and its peaceful character. This, far from proving the connections between both groups, is clear historical evidence of their deep incompatibility and rivalry. Indeed, according to Filiu, “al-Qaeda built its ideological doctrine largely in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood’s pervasive and once dominant approach to Islam’s political revival”.218

241. After all, the paths of terrorist groups and of the Brotherhood are completely divergent: they are essentially different kinds of organisations that offer completely distinct proposals to defend Islamic values and create an Islamic society.

iii. Different proposals and values: denying the ideological connection between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi-jihadists

242. As for the ideological similarities, it should first be recalled that the Brotherhood is the world’s oldest, largest and most influential Islamic organisation.219 The history of the Brotherhood is so long and its influence so wide that, it is not inconceivable, certain terrorist groups used some of the ideas originally proposed by renowned Muslim Brothers and adapted them to create their own ideology. As a matter of fact, according to Farag, “almost all of today’s different religious movements trace their origins back to the Muslim Brotherhood and its inspiration”.220

243. Therefore, there are some ideological similarities between the Brotherhood and certain extremists groups, above all, their conservative defence of an Islamic culture, their shared long-term aim to create an Islamic caliphate for Muslim citizens and the use of Shari’a, Islamic Law, as a legal source. Both types of groups have a global scope, oppose the progressive international process of Westernisation and criticize the United States’ cultural and political domination of the Middle East.


The connection between the Brotherhood and al-Qaeda is probably the most repeated in the Western media: the early membership to the Brotherhood of al-Qaeda’s leaders like Ayman al-Zawahiri or Bin Laden explains why the propaganda of some Arab regimes have always wanted to draw a comparison between both organisations. Proving a relationship between both groups belittles the Brotherhood, which constitutes a political threat to most of these regimes.\footnote{221 Lynch, M. (2010): “Islam Divided Between Salafi-jihad and the Ikhwan”, \textit{Studies in Conflict and Terrorism}, Vol. 33, No. 6, p. 470}

However, in reality, the relationship of the Brotherhood with al-Qaeda –as its relationship with the rest of Islamist terrorist groups – could be defined as “antagonist”.\footnote{222 Ibid.}

First, there are deep ideological differences between both groups: Marc Lynch, in “Islam divided between Salafi-jihad and the Ikhwan”, found several points of divergence between the ideology of the militant terrorist groups and the Brotherhood that will be analysed in this chapter. These differences are so wide that Salafi-jihadists “no longer recognise the Muslim Brotherhood as the inheritor of its own ideas”.\footnote{223 Köstem, B. (2013): “The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt: Democracy Redefined or Confined?”, \textit{Review of International Law and Politics (Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika)}, Issue 33, p. 172.}

Indeed, these groups disagree in their interpretation of basic Islamic concepts such as \textit{Shari’ah}, Islamic State, \textit{Jihad}, or \textit{Takfir}. According to Lynch, al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brothers also differ in what is the appropriate way to approach the Palestinian and Iraqi conflicts, the Shi’a question and the participation in public institutions.

Their notions of Islamic \textit{Caliphate} are completely different. The Muslim Brotherhood, far from defending a theocracy, would like to implement “a civil state with an Islamic reference”.\footnote{224 Farag, M. (2012): “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the January 25 Revolution: new political party, new circumstances”, \textit{Contemporary Arab Affairs}, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 215 and 221.} In contrast, the aim of those terrorist or extremist groups is to create a religious state.
“Al Qaeda’s conception of the Islamic state envisions absolute hakimiya [God’s sovereignty]; an extremely strict reading of Islamic behaviour and practice; the rigorous enforcement of Islamic morality; no place for civil law independent of Shari’a; no tolerance of diversity or interpretation; and no place whatsoever for the institution of the nation state”.\(^{225}\)

250. On the contrary, the Brotherhood has historically showed a great deal of flexibility and tolerance towards various systems of governance and interpretations of Islamic Law. As mentioned in Chapter 4, it has participated in the Egyptian elections in coalition with liberal political parties and formed part of syndicates, professional associations and student groups from various political identities.

251. Moreover, the Brotherhood, through its parliamentary activity, has not only respected, but also participated in the drafting of civil law.

252. The organisation follows the decisions taken by an independent judiciary, and traditionally accepted the legitimacy of state borders.\(^ {226}\) Indeed, the Global Muslim Brotherhood, itself, is divided in decentralised national branches.

253. A second difference between the Brotherhood and the Salafist-Jihadist is their degree of religious tolerance. For example, while the Muslim Brothers defend their antagonism with those of the Jewish faith “is for the sake of land only”; Ayman al-Zawahiri, the radical leader of al-Qaeda, argued that “God, glory to him, made the religion the cause of enmity and the cause of our fight”.\(^ {227}\)

254. These sentences show that the Brotherhood respects the existence and practice of other religions, while for terrorist militant groups they constitute a legitimate reason to commence a violent struggle.

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\(^{226}\) Ibid.

255. Third, Muslim Brothers do not recognise the *Takfir* doctrine, proposed by Sayyid Quth, which defends that only the “doctrinally pure” could be called “Muslims” whilst the rest of Islamic believers are considered mere *apostates*.\(^{228}\)

256. *Salafi-jihadists* groups use this doctrine to justify their terrorist oppression and carry out atrocities against Muslim citizens, something that the Brotherhood fiercely opposes.

257. In fact, Rajab Hilal Hamida, a Brotherhood member in Egypt’s parliament, exclaimed:

“*He who kills Muslim citizens is neither a jihad fighter nor a terrorist, but a criminal and a murderer. We must call things by their proper names!*”\(^{229}\)

258. Supreme Guide Hassan Hudaybi, in his *Preachers Not Judges*, criticised *Takfir*, and the Muslim Brotherhood officially rejected the doctrine.

259. However, the clearest difference between these two kinds of groups is that while radical extremist groups defend violence as a means to implement their ideas, the Muslim Brotherhood is an inherently peaceful organisation.

260. The Brotherhood has condemned every terrorist act that al-Qaeda or any of its sister groups have perpetrated in vast areas of the world.\(^{230}\) As a matter of fact, Supreme Guide Mohammed Mehdi Akef defined the 9/11 attacks on the Twin towers as “*a criminal act which could only have been carried out by criminals!*”\(^{231}\)

261. This is why the Brotherhood’s Deputy Supreme Guide, Mohammed Habib, argued that they “*reject completely the methods and actions by al-Qaeda network!*”\(^{232}\)

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\(^{231}\) *Ibid*.

\(^{232}\) *Idem*, p. 469
262. These differing positions towards violence are not the consequence of a “tactical movement” of the Brotherhood to gain followers and legitimacy among the Western world, as some Western authors suggest, but the consequence of ideological divergences between the Brotherhood and the Salafi-jihadists: the Brotherhood does not tolerate terrorism because it is contrary to its ideological conception of violence.

263. Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood make an extremely different interpretation of the Qur’anic concept of jihad:

“The MB has long embraced the centrality of jihad in Muslim life, but has never accepted Abdullah Azzam’s influential elevation of the duty of jihad to a central pillar of Islam which informed Salafi-jihadism”.


265. The book also interpreted jihad as an obligation only under very specific conditions, recovering the traditional interpretation of jihad as a defensive individual duty that only operates in case that Islam or a Muslim country is attacked.

266. Following this interpretation of jihad, the Brotherhood defends the use of force or resistance only in certain specific circumstances. For example, for Muslim Brothers force or resistance could be directed against foreign invasions, such as the one in Iraq; or foreign occupations, such as the one of Israel over Palestinian territories. However, these circumstances are very limited and the use of violence needs to be directed at ending the occupation: the Brotherhood differentiates

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235 Idem, p. 474
between illegitimate terrorism and legitimate resistance – as an act of self-defence.  

267. Moreover, al-Qaradawi’s *Jurisprudence of Jihad*, offered an alternative vision of *jihad* as “solidarity”, which does not include the use of violence.  

Indeed, this vision fits better with the Brotherhood’s ideology and its peaceful methods, which they have consistently defended through speeches, interviews, and documents in both Arabic and in English. This is why some authors argue that the Brotherhood’s version of *jihad* consists on “missionary activity and organised political struggle”.  

268. Al-Qaeda offers a contrary interpretation, in that it defends an offensive conception of *Jihad*, as a fight against the “*Jews, the Crusaders and the ‘apostate’ Muslim states*” with the objective to “*liberate* every Muslim land “from Granada to Kashgar” and create the Islamic Caliphate.  

For Salafi-jihadists “*martyrdom should be the true fulfilment of man’s life*”.  

269. While the Brotherhood criticises al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups for having “*nothing to offer than their futile ideology of violence and destruction*”, al-Qaeda condemns the Brotherhood’s participation in political processes and its engagement with civil society.  

270. The basis of the respective criticisms alone is evidence enough of how their beliefs and interpretation of Islamic principles are paradoxically at opposite ends of the scale and thus distinct from each other.

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271. Al-Qaeda extrapolates Qutb’s doctrine of jabiliya, which maintains that the Arab World is currently immersed in a “pre-Islamic age of ignorance”. The jabiliya could be defined as “the unbeliever’s rebellion against God’s sovereignty on earth”.245

272. For jihadi-salafists, in this state of jabiliya, it is not possible to participate in elections, engage with the ruling system or even, coexist with non-Islamists, as it would violate the principle of al-wala wa al-bara (“embracing all that is Islam and disavowing all that is not”).246 Therefore, they place themselves outside from this corrupted society and attempt to change it from the exterior.247

273. As a matter of fact, for al-Qaeda the parliamentary system represents “a deification of the people”,248 “a form of polytheism” and “a rejection of the doctrine of hakimiya (rule of God on earth)”249 because it gives primacy to “the will of a human majority over the will of God”.250

274. Moreover, for Islamist terrorists, participating in the public political process is a useless and ineffective tool to achieve a pure Islamic State. That is why al-Zawahiri questioned the gradual successes that the Brotherhood obtained in Egypt and highlighted the crackdown on the organisation, the desperate situation of Gaza under the rule of Hamas, the abuse of Islamist parties in Morocco and Jordan and the boycott of Hamas, which demonstrates what in his view is the “Western hypocrisy toward democracy and Islamists”.251


247 Idem, p. 472


251 Ibid.
275. In contrast, for the Brotherhood the peaceful participation in democratic political elections is part of the *da’wa* (outreach) process,\(^{252}\) an opportunity to change societies from within.\(^{253}\) For them, “the *umma* [the Muslim community] is the source of *sulta* [political authority],”\(^{254}\) which explains why they participated in all the electoral processes they were allowed to participate (except in those electoral process that were unfair and manifestly rigged).

276. All these arguments show that the Muslim Brotherhood and the *salafi*-jihadist groups intensely differ on their methods and ideology. While it is true that both are Islamic groups, they have a completely different essential nature and disagree in their interpretation of the core concepts of the Islamic culture.

**iv. Lack of material support: the case of Youssef Nada.**

277. Some commentators argue that apart from the ideological or political support, the Brotherhood also provides “material support” to Islamist terrorist groups.

278. Yet, the report commissioned by the Egyptian State Litigation Authority bases most of its argument on the Swiss and Italian investigations of the *al Taqwa Bank* and its Chairman Youssef Nada.

279. This is surprising, as this case constitutes one of the most famous examples of the unfairness, arbitrariness, discriminator, Islamophobic and “Witch Hunting” approach that modern, western, counter-terrorism policy has generated during the last decades.

280. The investigations concerning Youssef Nada, a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood, attempted to prove that he had provided funds and material assistance to terrorist organisations through the *al Taqwa Bank*.

\(^{252}\) Ibid.


281. As a consequence of these investigations, the U.S., in its Executive Order 13224, included Nada in a “Black List” of terrorists\(^\text{255}\) and promoted the inclusion of his name on the UN Security Council’s list of individuals allegedly linked to al-Qaeda.

282. The Swiss Media reported that the police searched the home of Nada in Italy, raided *al Taqwa Bank*’s headquarters in Lugano “and hauled away vanloads of documents”.\(^\text{256}\) The company’s accounts and Nada’s personal assets were blocked or frozen.

283. However, both the Swiss and the Italian investigations were discontinued, as they did not find any evidence to support that Nada had helped terrorist groups.\(^\text{257}\) No charges were presented against Nada, who was understood to be the main target of an anti-Muslim political campaign.

284. Moreover, the U.S. government neither published nor disseminated any evidence that could prove these allegations. Indeed, the documents sent to bolster the Swiss investigation lacked “substance” according to the Swiss Federal Criminal Court.\(^\text{258}\)

285. The name of Nada was definitively erased on the terror black list of the UN Security Council in 2009.\(^\text{259}\) Interestingly, both, the Italian and the Swiss governments supported this decision.

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Nevertheless, Nada’s assets, freedom and reputation had been severely damaged, a clear and obvious consequence of having his name linked with terrorism, regardless of its substance or otherwise. This is the reason why he sued the Swiss Federal Prosecutor’s Office in 2006 for financial damages.\footnote{Swissinfo (2006): “Terror suspect sues Swiss government”, 1\textsuperscript{st} June 2006. Available at: http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/terror-suspect-sues-swiss-government/5232394. Last accessed: 11th June 2015.} It is noteworthy that already in 2005 the Swiss Federal Criminal Court had criticised the prosecutors of this case for not providing enough substantiated reasons for the allegations and for delaying the decision to hand the case over to a tribunal.\footnote{Swissinfo (2005): “Prosecutors face ultimatum over terror case”, 1\textsuperscript{st} June 2005. Available at: http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/prosecutors-face-ultimatum-over-terror-case/4494218. Last accessed: 11th June 2015.}

Finally, Nada brought his case against Switzerland to the European Court of Human Rights, which, in 2012 held that Switzerland had violated Youssef Nada’s human rights under the European Convention of Human Rights.

According to the Court’s decision, the state of Switzerland:

“could not validly confine itself to relying on the binding nature of Security Council resolutions, but should have persuaded the Court that it had taken—or at least had attempted to take—all possible measures to adapt the sanctions regime to the applicant’s individual situation”.\footnote{European Court of Human Rights, “\textit{Case of Nada vs. Switzerland}”, Grand Chamber, 12\textsuperscript{th} September 2012, Application no. 10593/08, par. 196. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-113118#{%22itemid%22:}%22001-113118%22}. Last accessed: 11\textsuperscript{th} June 2015.}

Therefore, Switzerland had violated Nada’s freedom of movement under article 8 of the European Court of Human Rights:

“Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that the restrictions imposed on the applicant’s freedom of movement for a considerable period of time did not strike a fair balance between his right to the protection of his private and family life, on the one hand, and the legitimate aims of the prevention of crime and the protection of Switzerland’s national security and public safety, on the other. Consequently, the interference with his right to respect for
private and family life was not proportionate and therefore not necessary in a democratic society.”

290. The Court also found the Swiss authorities responsible for having deprived Youssef Nada from “any effective means of obtaining the removal of his name from the list annexed to the Taliban Ordinance”, which violated article 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

In the end the Court ordered the Swiss state to pay 30,000 Euros to Nada in respect of costs and expenses.

292. Far from constituting evidence of the material support provided by the Muslim Brotherhood to terrorist groups, Youssef Nada’s case is a clear example of the Western counter-terrorism hysteria and its intolerance towards the Brotherhood. Another example of the human rights violations that the members of Brotherhood had historically suffered for being confused with the Salafi-Jihadists.

293. Indeed, Nada’s situation was defined as Kankan and “absurd, arbitrary, inexplicable et inexorable” by Recordon Luc, counsellor of the Etats Canton Vaud in a session of the Swiss Conseil des Etats.

294. Finally, Nada’s case became essential for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) to call for the revision of “the UN and EU blacklisting procedures for terrorist suspects, which violate human rights”.

263 European Court of Human Rights, “Case of Nada vs. Switzerland”, Grand Chamber, 12th September 2012, Application no. 10593/08, par. 198. Available at:

264 European Court of Human Rights, “Case of Nada vs. Switzerland”, Grand Chamber, 12th September 2012, Application no. 10593/08, par. 213. Available at:


v. Salafi-jihadist criticisms to the Muslim Brotherhood: “the most important enemy” of al-Qaeda.

295. The conflicting agenda of the Brotherhood and Salafi-jihadist’s sharpened tensions in Muslim countries and clashed significantly during the Iraq war, when the Iraqi Islamic Party, dependent on the Iraqi branch of the Brotherhood, joined the U.S.-backed political process and entered into public institutions.267 This was contrary to the wishes of al-Qaeda in Iraq and its “declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq” in October 2006.268

296. According to Lynch, one month later, Ali al-Na’imi, spokesman of the jihadi Islamic Army of Iraq, defined the Iraqi Islamic Party as “nothing but supporters of the enemies of the abl al-sunna, the crusaders and ruwafidh” and called all “honest Muslims” to leave the Party.269 Since then, as Filiu argues, the Iraqi Islamic Party became “one of Zarqawi’s favourite targets” in his zone of influence.270

297. The ideological conflict between the groups progressed as far as al-Qaeda naming the Global Muslim Brotherhood its “most important enemy”, attacking the Party and defining all their Islamic rivals as “Ikhwani”.271

298. However, the tensions between both groups, based on ideological reasons, were already high even before the Iraqi war. For example, during the 1990s, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group fought against the Muslim Brotherhood-backed Islamic Salvation Front; and the Muslim Brotherhood has been repeatedly affected


269 Ibid.


by the waves of oppression used to target Islamist terrorist groups,\textsuperscript{272} but naturally, were felt throughout the Islamic world.

299. The comments and criticisms of certain al-Qaeda leaders – as al-Zawahiri, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi or Abu Hamza al-Muhajir – towards the Brotherhood have become increasingly hostile during the last years.\textsuperscript{273}

300. In \textit{Bitter Harvest}, al-Zawahiri criticised the ideological position of the Brotherhood and its political stance against \textit{jihadism}.\textsuperscript{274} This document is considered one of the clearest theoretical and doctrinal divisions between both groups as it reviews their differences and lists the Brotherhood’s apparent “\textit{chain of betrayals}” against the \textit{Salafi-jihadist} during the last two decades.\textsuperscript{275} According to al-Qaeda, the Brotherhood’s peaceful participation in the political system respect neither God’s sovereignty, nor the duty of \textit{jihad}.\textsuperscript{276}

301. Al-Zawahiri’s criticisms towards the Brotherhood have been constant during the last decades. He has accused the Brotherhood of “treason” for serving “US interests”. He has called the Brothers “corrupt” for opting for a non-violent path and condemned their participation in legislative elections,\textsuperscript{277} which, according to al-Zawahiri, betrays “the values of Islamism”.\textsuperscript{278} In his own words, the Muslim Brotherhood:

\begin{quote}
“lure thousands of young Muslim men into lines for elections […] instead of into the lines of \textit{jihad}”.\textsuperscript{279}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{272} Idem, p. 470

\textsuperscript{273} Idem, p. 468


\textsuperscript{277} Hansen, H. (2009): “Islamism and Western Political Religions”, \textit{Religion Compass}, Vol. 3, No. 6, p. 1034

\textsuperscript{278} \textit{Ibid}.

Other criticisms of the Brotherhood come from Abd al-Majid Abd al-Karim Hazeen, who condemned the Brotherhood’s heterodox reading of the Qur’an and its alliances with “Crusaders, Communists, Jews, Masons”.280 Further, Said Imam al-Sharif – known as Doctor Fadl – criticised the Brotherhood for “collaborating with apostate regimes”;281 and Louis Attiyatollah defined the Brotherhood as “a spent force”. After the Brotherhood and Hamas’s successes in Egypt and Gaza respectively, the jihadist Fatah al-Rahman wrote a document, on behalf of the Shari’a Committee of the Jihad, criticising the Brotherhood ideological religious deviations.282 Finally, Akram Hijazi, the jihadist writer asked:

“What remains of hakimiyyah (God’s sovereignty) or jihad when the Islamic Party participates in occupation of Muslim lands […] when other MB branches participate in governments not based on shari’ah […] deny that jihad is an individual obligation […] attack the jihad and the jihadist program […] deny the doctrine of takfir”?283

The antagonism and the ideological differences between al-Qaeda and the Brotherhood are so great that some authors even defend that al-Qaeda “built its ideological doctrine largely in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood’s pervasive and once dominant approach to Islam’s political revival”.284

However, given their parallels with al-Qaeda, the same ideological differences can be applied to other salafist-jihadist groups, as Boko Haram, the Islamic State or al-Shabaab. In fact, Mohammed Yusuf, founder of Boko Haram followed Qutb’s theory of Hakimiyyah –“sovereignty of Allah”–, which is incompatible with


283 Idem, p. 471.

electoral processes. He considered democracy as “evil” and shari’a as the only source of law.285

305. Moreover, although certain commentators have interpreted the Muslim Brothers’ opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Assad and their condemnation of the air strikes on the Islamic State, as evidence of their political support for the Islamic State, the truth is that the violence implemented by ISIS is not compatible with the ideological position of the Brotherhood.

306. As a matter of fact, the ideological discrepancies between both groups are so clear that Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, has severely excoriated the Brotherhood. He disparaged the Brotherhood for “entering into peculiar alliances with the apostate regimes” while showing “rampant hostility towards the Salafi Jihadists”.286 He added that the Muslim Brothers “have truly betrayed our religion and the Islamic nation, and they have abandoned the blood of the martyrs”.287

307. Moreover, the Islamic State joined al-Qaeda in blaming the Muslim Brotherhood’s “political approach” as the reason for the oppression that the group has been suffering in Egypt after the ousting of Mohammad Morsi.

308. Al-Qaeda, which defends that the Caliphate can only be achieved through violence and jihad, argues that the peaceful and democratic means of the Brotherhood are completely useless:

“All who call to resist falsehood with peacefulness is swimming in a sea of illusions, and perhaps in a sea of blood, in vain”.288

309. Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State echoed these criticisms, defining the Brotherhood as “a secular party with an Islamic garb” and “more evil and cunning than the secularists”.289


287 Ibid.

“The Islamic State had known that Right cannot be restored except by force, so it chose the ammunition boxes and not the ballot boxes and that the lifting of injustice and change cannot happen except by the sword, so it insisted on negotiating in the trenches and not in hotels, and abandoned the lights of conferences.” ²⁹⁰

310. However, the criticisms of these groups are not only directed against the Egyptian Brotherhood, but also against Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood according to the Hamas Charter. ²⁹¹

311. Hamas was founded in 1987 out of a Palestinian secession of the Jordanian Brotherhood.²⁹² Its religious character keeps Hamas at a distance from Fatah, which dominated the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). At the same time, its nationalistic focus separated Hamas from the more international approach of groups such as al-Qaeda, which attempt to expand jihad globally.

312. The history of the organisation includes certain episodes of violence that could be considered improper for a Brotherhood organisation, which, ideologically, should be more inclined to political participation and social action. Nevertheless, it is necessary to remember that Palestine is an officially occupied territory and in those circumstances, the Muslim Brotherhood (and certain rules of International Law) allows the use of violence.

313. Moreover, as Schwedle argues, moderate peaceful groups may rhetorically support foreign militant groups, even if they would “not themselves use violence against their own regimes.” ²⁹³

314. These episodes of violence and Hamas’s opposition to the peace agreements signed between Israel and the PLO, made certain al-Qaeda members, as Osama

²⁹⁰ Idem, p. 35.
²⁹¹ Idem, p. 34.
Bin Laden, support Shaykh Ahmad Yassin, the founder of Hamas and praise Hamas “martyrs”.  

Nevertheless, with the passing of time, Hamas has progressively moved towards a more moderate position and participated in the Palestinian elections. In addition, Hamas gaining inspiration from the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood began to build mosques, schools and medical services for citizens.  

Indeed, the governments of United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand do not currently consider Hamas a proscribed terrorist organisation. Only the militant group Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades is included in their lists of terrorist organisations.  

Moreover, the General Court of the European Union annulled the Council of the European Union’s decision to maintain Hamas on the European list of terrorist organisations, as that decision was based solely on “factual elements […] derived from the press or the Internet”.  

However, Hamas’s turn to moderation transformed al-Qaeda’s previous admiration in fierce criticism.

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319. All the rhetoric directed against the Egyptian-style Brotherhood was re-adapted for Hamas. From the salafi-jihadist’s point of view, Hamas was following the path of other branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, “betraying God’s sovereignty and embracing the ‘infidel’ system of democracy.” Moreover, al-Qaeda argued that the Hamas’s participation in the elections served to tacitly recognise the state of Israel.

320. Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian elections held in Gaza and took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. This resulted in a further deterioration between both groups, above all, when Hamas decided to suppress every armed violent group in the Strip.

321. It is noteworthy that the relationships between the Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine were already negative, even before the first intifada. According to Ziyad Abu-Amr:

“No attempts until then were made at unification, serious reconciliation or narrowing of major differences. Disputes between the two groups had at one point turned into violent clashes.”

322. The dismantlement of al-Qaeda-inspired groups in Gaza, enraged al-Qaeda’s leaders, who increased their public commentaries criticising Hamas’s ideology and its participation in political institutions. For Osama bin Laden, Hamas had neglected Islam and accepted international agreements with infidels, which violated the al-wala wa al-bara principle. Al-Zawahiri considered Hamas guilty of having “surrendered four-fifths of Palestine.”

323. However, once again, the criticisms did not come solely from al-Qaeda. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, called upon Hamas’s members to

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302 Idem, p. 19.
leave the group *en masse* and its military wing to organize a coup d’état against Hamas’s “deviant and corrupt political leadership”.

### vi. Concluding remarks

324. This chapter has sought to expose the historical, ideological and political differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and the militant Islamist groups. Far from supporting each other, the reality, is that they are competing groups with radically different proposals to defend Islamic values and create an Islamic state.

325. Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood seems to be the greatest challenge for al-Qaeda and the rest of Islamist terrorist groups: as they contend to become the legitimate global interlocutor of Islamic politics.

326. The Western world, instead of considering them as “allies” or “sister organisations”, should regard the Brotherhood and the *salafi-jihadi* as what they truly are: opponent groups with deep ideological disparities, contradicting agendas and antagonistic paths.

327. Until the violent crackdown on the Egyptian branch, the Brotherhood seemed to be winning the popular legitimacy battle to the *salafi-jihadi* while the Muslim Brotherhood’s moderation granted the Brothers wide general support among citizens, al-Qaeda remained a minority force in the region. Moreover, the Brotherhood’s presence in the Arab media, in public institutions and in civil society organizations offered the Brotherhood more opportunities to expand and explain its vision and ideas. Arguably, the message of the Muslim Brotherhood seems to fit the mainstream political opinion in the Arab region, which shows significant support to the principles of democracy and religious values; by

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305 Ibid.


contrast al-Qaeda remains deeply unpopular\textsuperscript{308} and unable to enter into Egyptian society.\textsuperscript{309} Therefore, the Brotherhood is able to maintain a larger number of members that, attracted to the democratic and peaceful ideas of the organisation, escape from the radicalisation of the \textit{Salafi \textit{Jihadist}}.\textsuperscript{310}

328. The long history of the Brotherhood has repeatedly showed us that indiscriminately attacking the Brotherhood and depriving them of their electoral successes only strengthen the position of radical terrorist groups that criticised the Brotherhood's peaceful manners. The mass arbitrary arrests of thousands of peaceful citizens in Egypt damage the reputation of the moderate and pragmatist Muslim Brothers and exports \textit{“fundamentalism and terrorism to other states”}.\textsuperscript{311}

329. The violent repression against the Brotherhood and its expulsion from the democratic political process only succeeds in pushing hundreds of youngsters towards extremism and eases their recruitment into terrorist groups. As a matter of fact, some authors argue that al-Zawahiri left Egypt because he had been tortured and humiliated and find his terrorist action as \textit{“a product of a repressive system”}.\textsuperscript{312}

330. Therefore, the Western media, politicians and institutions should stop looking for the connections between the Brotherhood and the \textit{Salafi \textit{Jihadist}}, and instead, focus on their differences. They should realise that they are facing groups that are completely different and therefore support the moderate Brotherhood, which has historically defended a peaceful and democratic agenda for the political Islam. This is the only way to win the 21\textsuperscript{st}-century battle against violence, fanaticism and radicalisation.


\textsuperscript{309} \textit{Idem}, p. 478

\textsuperscript{310} \textit{Idem}, p. 480


Chapter 5: International view of the Muslim Brotherhood

331. The view of the Brotherhood internationally appears to be one to which parallels can be drawn to the view of Islam more generally, that being one of suspicion and mistrust.

332. An interesting issue however is that very little coverage in the mass media and political circles was afforded to issues concerning the Brotherhood prior to Egypt’s involvement in the Arab Spring and thereafter the rise and fall of President Morsi post the Mubarak era.

333. One must question therefore why it wasn’t until 2012/2013 that global attention turned to the Brotherhood and its activities.

334. Having had its attention turned to it however, questions must also be asked of the international community with regard to the approach adopted, and whether this approach encouraged and fostered the suspicion and mistrust.

335. The simple answer to this point must be ‘yes’.

336. The UK in particular found itself under pressure\textsuperscript{313} from its partners in the Gulf States and thus announced its poorly timed and poorly described ‘Government Review’\textsuperscript{314} into the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood.

337. The UAE and Saudi Arabia (albeit without the support of Qatar) reacted at the most extreme of levels and simply denounced the Brotherhood as a terrorist

\textsuperscript{313} Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate, Abdel Bari Atwan

group, and therefore rendering membership or support of the Brotherhood as unlawful.\footnote{Ajbaili, M. (2014): “Saudi: Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group”, \textit{Al-Arabiya News}, 7\textsuperscript{th} March 2014. Available at: http://english.alaribiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/03/07/Saudi-Arabia-declares-Muslim-Brotherhood-terrorist-group.html. Last accessed: 11th June 2015.}

338. The US, as much as no specific or announced action had been taken, simply by virtue of its silence on happenings within the middle-east, with the unchallenged rhetoric\footnote{Ritz, E. (2012): “House Members Demand Answers on Depth of U.S. Involvement With the Muslim Brotherhood”, \textit{The Blaze}, 15\textsuperscript{th} June 2012. Available at: http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2012/06/15/house-members-demand-answers-on-depth-of-u-s-involvement-with-the-muslim-brotherhood/. Last accessed: 11th June 2015.} of certain members of the political classes, and with the promulgation of right wing media,\footnote{Schachtel, J. (2015): “The Muslim Brotherhood Comes To The White House”, \textit{Fox News}, 8\textsuperscript{th} February 2015. Available at: http://nation.foxnews.com/2015/02/08/muslim-brotherhood-comes-white-house. Last accessed: 11th June 2015.} has contributed to the state of almost hysteria we are faced with when seeking to discuss the Brotherhood and its activities.

339. This chapter can therefore be split into three subsections, namely the position as far as the Middle East is concerned, the position in the UK, and the position in the US. All three arenas have adopted a differing approach to the situation, but have all played their part in reaching the position with which we are now faced.

340. In dealing with the position in the Middle East, Egypt has been deliberately removed from the equation. The position of the Brotherhood in Egypt is a chapter on its own, and is likely to be the subject of second report when dealing with what is now oft referred to as ‘political Islam’.

341. Further, the position adopted by Egypt under the regime of el-Sisi is arguably the catalyst behind the recent scrutiny and thus a significant contributing factor to the level of mistrust, suspicion and anti-Islamic rhetoric that is apparent in the West.

342. It is worthy of note at this stage that the turmoil in Egypt, in Syria, Iraq, and now Libya, following the crackdown on the Brotherhood in Egypt has lead to a number of individuals equating all Muslims and followers of Islam as being of the same ideology and thus placing them under the same umbrella.


The implications of this conflation are catastrophic as we reach the position where we liken all to those who espouse an extremist ideology, and thus a significant proportion equate ‘Muslim’ or ‘Muslim Brotherhood’, or any other group with IS/ISIS/Da’esh and thus a position is adopted that is to the detriment of millions of Muslims worldwide. This is much the same as those issues discussed in brief within the introduction to this report in that we do not adopt this position when considering those of other faiths that embrace an extremist ideology.

i. The Middle East

On 7 March 2014, Saudi Arabia deemed the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation along with three other Middle East based groups, namely, Hezbollah, ISIS, and al-Nusra Front.

The immediate inference to be drawn therefore is that the Muslim Brotherhood could be likened to these overtly terrorist groups.

It is of interest however that the reason given by Abdel Latif al-Sheikh, head of the Saudi religious police, was that “they were ruled from outside to serve political purposes”.

It appears therefore that the real concern of Saudi Arabia insofar as the Muslim Brotherhood is concerned, and thereafter the majority of the rest of the UAE who followed suit, was not the actions of such groups insofar as terrorist attacks etc were concerned given that the Brotherhood is not an armed group, but that they had a political purpose, as noted by Jeddah based lawyer Bassim Alim “…the Muslim Brotherhood is known to be a nonviolent entity and ideology”.

This point is very telling given the violent crackdown in the UAE and other Gulf stations against anyone who seeks to argue an alternative view to that of the ruling dynasty.


347. Ibid.

348. Ibid.
349. The real fear therefore is political change, of influence over the citizens, and the risk that those citizens may take confidence from neighbours who participated in the various uprisings during the Arab Spring and may seek to demand their voices be heard in their own states, a point that was eluded to by Mohammad Zulfa, member of the Shura Council “We were wrong when we opened the doors of our schools and universities to foreigners who allowed such ideas to reach our youth”.  

350. Yet, despite the Saudi reaction on the basis of security and prevention of terrorism, the decision was still met with bewilderment, and the point made that “we’ve had the Brotherhood here without any terrorism for 50 years”.  

351. Respected academics have not been able to reconcile the decision, Radawan Masmoudi, president of the Washington-based Centre for the Study of Islam and Democracy, noting “At a time when Saudi Arabia wants to be the leader of the Sunni world, I think it’s very damaging to their own interests…I don’t think it was well thought out”.  

352. It is therefore clearly arguable that the real motivation was to continue the policy of silencing any form of dissent in a state where all political parties are banned and where all notions of political reform are seen as a direct attack against the State; a state where dissent is deemed a criminal offence.  

353. Having taken the lead on the issue, the majority of the UAE followed suit, aside from Qatar.  

354. Qatar risked isolation from the UAE following its decision to still welcome Brotherhood members, a decision that resulted in a number of UAE ambassadors being withdrawn from the State by way of protest, and threats of  


323 Ibid.
further action being taken, such as the closing of the border between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.\textsuperscript{324}

355. In short therefore, there appears to be no justifiable basis for the designation of the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation and the decision was simply taken on the basis of the fear of a popular uprising.

356. The decision however has had ramifications felt across the world.

\textit{ii. The United Kingdom}

357. On 17 April 2014, the UK Government announced that it had commissioned a review into the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, its purpose being to “\textit{provide an internal report to the Prime Minister to inform government policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood. The scope of the review covers the Muslim Brotherhood’s origins, philosophy, activities, record in and out of government; its organisation and activities in the UK and abroad which might put at risk, damage, or risk damaging UK national interests. It will look at the Muslim Brotherhood’s impact on, and influence over, UK national interests, at home, abroad, as well as its wider influence on UK society. It will also look at current government policy as well as allies’ approaches and policies, and assess the implications for UK policy}”.\textsuperscript{325}

358. As of 8 June 2015 the report following that review has not been published and one must question as to why.

359. However, we must first consider why the review was announced and how this impacts on the international opinion of the Brotherhood.

360. The timing of the announcement was curious to say the least and it is certainly no coincidence that the announcement came so soon after Saudi Arabia and the UAE took the action as noted above.


361. To take the matter further, there is a significant level of opinion that the sole reason for the commission was the pressure put on the UK government by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, an issue confirmed by an unnamed Downing Street source,326 and Dr Lorenzo Vidino, an expert on the Brotherhood in the West who contributed to the review.327

362. The decision to commission such a review appears to contradict events of May 2013, whereupon UK Prime Minister, David Cameron invited the international spokesman of the Muslim Brotherhood to his country retreat of Chequers. It was documented that during this meeting, Cameron was presented with the ‘vision’ of the Brotherhood, and responded by asking what the UK could do to help.328

363. If, the UK Government had genuine concerns as to the philosophy and actions of the Brotherhood, one would have expected that any such review or investigation would have been commissioned some considerable time ago, especially when we take into account that the Brotherhood as an entity has been present in the UK for decades, has been acknowledged by various governments of the UK as such,329 and has been present without apparent issue.

364. The willingness of the UK to therefore adhere to the demands of its partners in the Middle East is of significant concern, but beyond the scope of this report.

365. The reality of the position however is that the review was so poorly timed, so poorly organised, and without any real terms of reference, so as to render the entire exercise without credibility and therefore of very little use.


327 Ibid.


366. It does perhaps evidence however that the UK took no real issue with the Brotherhood and its members historically, and given that over a year later, the findings of that review have not been published, it still does not take any real issue.

367. An essential point to note however is that as much as the report has not been published, it has been confirmed that the review concluded that the Brotherhood was not a terrorist organisation and therefore there would be no question of seeking to ban the movement.

368. This conclusion alone has no doubt caused reverberations behind closed doors within the Middle East, as alluded to by former Foreign Secretary, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who attributed the delay to "diplomatic problems" in that the UK has a "large number of friendly governments who are bitterly opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood and others who take the opposite view." ³³⁰

369. This would however appear to contradict the position of another unnamed source who is said to have been close to discussion who referred to the review, or Jenkins panel, as "laughing about this whole hysteria about banning the Muslim Brotherhood", saying that this was never on the cards, and that the Saudi Government understood this. ³³¹

370. We must again therefore ask the question ‘why’.

371. A likely conclusion to draw to the issue of the UK’s opinion of the Brotherhood therefore is that it takes no real position as far as for or against is concerned, but, its actions paint a very different view, and it is those actions that are seen across the world and in particular the middle-east, and given those actions, those other nations may see their decision as being vindicated and thus they can continue to seek to silence political dissent with apparent impunity.

372. Despite their being no basis for such an unjustifiable reaction, it has to an extent been legitimised and thus the cycle of suspicion and mistrust grows.

³³⁰ Ibid.
³³¹ Ibid.
iii. The United States

373. The position adopted by the US is, as one would expect, complex, often reactionary, and generally contradictory. That said, one could also say that the US is benign in its attitude towards the Brotherhood in that doesn’t appear to criticise or accepting equal measure, perhaps adopting the view that the Brotherhood is of no real consequence for the US.

374. This is not the position adopted by all in the US government, as one would expect.

375. There is also the obligatory liberal smattering of traditional right wing hysterical bias, Middle East analyst, Clare Lopez suggesting that it makes no sense to work with such groups “when all are jihadis and all want to destroy our civilization & subjugate us to Sharia”,\(^\text{332}\) for instance.

376. Current republican congressmen, Trent Franks, Louis Gohmert and Lynn Westmoreland co-signed a letter sent to the inspector general’s office of the State Department, authored by Representative Michele Bachman which sought to suggest that an aide to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Huma Abedin, was in fact the person directing the Obama administration on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood.\(^\text{333}\)

377. Such spurious and ridiculous claims were rejected out of hand by the administration, some referring to the letter as ‘dangerous’\(^\text{334}\) given the inference and connotation of its content.

378. As much as there is criticism of anything remotely to do with Islam and Muslims in the US along with the abounding conspiracy theories, we must take into account that there is no official criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood of any note, and thus the suggestion that the position is one that can be deemed to be benign.


\(^{333}\) \text{Ibid.}

\(^{334}\) \text{Ibid.}
Of concern however, is that the bastion of freedom and human rights that the US holds itself out to be, has not taken the decision to criticise the regime of el-Sisi, nor does it seek to criticise the autocratic governance of Saudi Arabia and the UAE where dissent and opposition is met with imprisonment and physical beating.

We can consider a number of other states and their approach to the Muslim Brotherhood and Islam in general, however, the majority of these can be said to perhaps follow the lead of the US and the UK through the UN Security Council and the G7 meetings.

What is clear however, even after this brief analysis is that policy adopted towards the Muslim Brotherhood and the extent to which there is a policy appears to be wholly dependent on the status of the ruling class in that case, the basis upon which they govern, and whether the Muslim Brotherhood can offer any form of opposition or alternative to that established power.

In reaching this conclusion we must re-visit the position in those states mentioned.

In Egypt, there was a military coup d’état to remove the first and only democratically elected President of Egypt, Mohammad Morsi, thereafter the Brotherhood were banned and membership or support of the group would result in prosecution and likely death.

Contrary to the position advanced by el-Sisi, this approach is not on the basis of the prevention and battle against terrorism, but rather, the fact that the Brotherhood retained significant support which to an extent became all the more entrenched with the imprisonment of over 16,000 civilians and the death sentences imposed on over a thousand of those, including Mohammad Morsi.

As a result of that continued support the Brotherhood or the newly formed political entity of the Freedom and Justice Party could have mounted a legitimate and significant challenge at the ballot box.
386. Such a position could clearly not be tolerated by a military whose role went far beyond the protection of the state and had in fact infiltrated all elements of state, and therefore this opposition had to be eliminated.

387. Designation as terrorist and the accompanying rhetoric was the easiest although wholly illegitimate way to undermine and eradicate opposition.

388. We turn now to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with a ruling class in fear that a newly empowered populace that drew inspiration from its brothers in Egypt and Tunisia could potentially threaten their absolute hold on power.

389. The House of Saud therefore has to make a decision, does it allow the potential popular protest, listen to the people, and bring about a programme of reform and change as per the will of the people; or, fearing the loss of absolute power does it take another option, the option that removes a potential problem at source and allows them to embark on a programme of violent crackdown on any who suggest opposition to the regime, all justified by suggesting those individuals are terrorist.

390. Saudi Arabia and the UAE took the second option and thus the Muslim Brotherhood were designated as a terrorist organisation despite there being neither previous instances of terrorist activities nor any suggestion that there would be in the future.

391. The Muslim Brotherhood merely served a purpose in that they are a large and organised group and thus used to set an example to those that advanced the argument of change.

392. The position adopted by these states must be contrasted with those states that fully respect the principles of democracy and do not seek to restrict a call for change, but empower its citizens through respect for democratic principles such as the rule of law, of freedom of speech, and of the right to peacefully protest.

393. No non-violent group can be deemed a threat to a nation who embraces the fundamentals of democracy, and no such group can be legitimately be described as a threat without the evidence to support such an allegation.
394. Therefore, although clumsy and, in the case of the UK approach, perhaps leading to a deepening mistrust and suspicion which in turn creates its own problems, the approach taken by the west has to be seen as the appropriate one, in that, where there is no evidence to support an allegation no action is taken and therefore the status quo is preserved.

395. Therefore, despite the actions and clear hopes of the middle east and gulf states, the Brotherhood as not been ostracised or rendered unlawful, and neither should it.

396. The report of Egyptian State Litigation Authority is at pains to attempt to draw a link between the Muslim Brotherhood and various terrorist groups in an effort to support and thus legitimise the decision initially taken by Egypt and closely followed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, however, this legitimacy has not been forthcoming as the West, and in particular the UK and the US have not followed suit. They have rejected the position adopted by these states and chosen to maintain the status quo.

397. The reality therefore is regardless of any tenuous link that those with an agenda seek to make, the Muslim Brotherhood is not a threat, nor does it espouse the violent tendencies that others suggest.

398. Unfortunately however the Brotherhood are still seen with an element of mistrust and suspicion not necessarily because of their principles, but certainly because of the manner in which the issue has been approached by western governments and the mass media.
Chapter 6: The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood post-Mubarak

399. This chapter must be considered with the caveat that an in-depth consideration of the Muslim Brotherhood in power is dealt with in the second in this series of reports, and thus this chapter should be considered as an overview, rather than one which analyses the position ‘in-depth’.

400. Its purpose is to set the scene.

401. The dramatic rise of the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Freedom and Justice Party, took everyone by surprise, including numerous members of the Brotherhood itself.

402. This was arguably due to one reason, the ability to organise and mobilise. An ability that other parties had not had the time to develop.

403. The revolution of 25 January was spontaneous, non-religious, and non-politicised. The actions of a small group of citizens generated such momentum as had not been seen before in Egypt.

404. There are those that suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood, seeking to ‘hijack’ a popular protest to further its own agenda, dominated the revolt. This would however be an entirely incorrect characterisation of events.

405. The reality is that the only link between the protests and the Brotherhood was that the popular youth movement contained individuals who were also simultaneously members of the Brotherhood.335

406. The Brotherhood were in fact noticeably absent from the initial stages of the revolution, fearing that the protests were merely symbolic and would be short lived, much the same as previous protests had been.336


407. Further, there was a genuine fear that had they become involved at that stage, they would have targeted by the security services who had been responsible for the increase in ‘crackdowns’, apparent from the 1990’s onwards.\textsuperscript{337}

408. It was only belatedly that Brotherhood members realised that the protests were unlike any other movement before it, in terms of numbers, and in terms of diversity amongst protestors which included a significant number of women. The movement was a truly popular and inclusive uprising.

409. Having seen the difference, and seen the possibility that this particular protest could be different, the Brotherhood officially endorsed participation in the protests and continued to do so, up until the resignation of Mubarak, on 11 February.\textsuperscript{338}

410. The resignation of Mubarak began a whirlwind of change and uncertainty in the immediate aftermath.

411. During the transitional period, the army retained power so as to attempt to promote stability.

412. The law in relation to political parties was amended and thus the Muslim Brotherhood formed the Freedom and Justice Party in June 2011 to contest the election.

413. The central point to consider at this stage, is that during the period in which the elections being planned, the first truly inclusive, free, and fair elections, there was no attempt by any group to ‘seize’ power.

414. The picture painted by many, including the report commissioned by the State Litigation Authority of Egypt,\textsuperscript{339} is that the Muslim Brotherhood, and therefore the Freedom and Justice Party by default, are proponents of a militant and extremist ideology.

\textsuperscript{337} \textit{Ibid}

\textsuperscript{338} \textit{Ibid}

415. One must therefore consider why, if the movement was so well mobilised and organised, did it seek to fully engage with the new democratic process in Egypt, as this would appear to not conform to the image portrayed by some.

416. The reality is that the Brotherhood sought to engage with the democratic process, as it was believed to be the appropriate process, thus showing ideals can develop and change through time.

417. History is littered with examples of a changing ideology, some of which have been referred to in earlier chapters of this report. The common theme with all of these examples is that principles espoused at a point in history do not necessarily reflect the principles upon which a group is based in the present.

418. It was not so long ago that the UK refused to allow women to vote for instance, until the popular ‘suffragette’ movement[^340] demanded change.


420. A group should not necessarily be judged by the position it adopted historically, and thus the Brotherhood can be seen as developing a political party to engage with the new democratic process in Egypt.

421. The FJP won the election that followed the revolution.

422. Here we must note, that the elections were free, they were fair, and there is no suggestion that any form of interference with the process took place[^343].


423. For the first time therefore Egyptian society had been given a voice and allowed to use it.

424. The FJP took advantage of the fact that a campaign apparatus had to a point already been in place and thus they managed to mobilise faster and more efficiently than other that’s sought to stand.\textsuperscript{344} This is not a point however upon which they should be criticised.

425. Further to the above, there was already a groundswell of support in situ given the work that the Brotherhood and its members had undertaken over the years, providing social care\textsuperscript{345} etc.

426. The FJP confirmed their commitment to the democratic process,\textsuperscript{346} and confirmed their commitment towards reform,\textsuperscript{347} and it is here that the alarm bells began to ring throughout the Egyptian old guard, given that as much as Mubarak had been removed, his apparatus was still in place to an extent, and the those related to the old regime, including the military, harboured genuine concerns as to how and what reforms would take place, given their fear of losing influence.

427. It is also appropriate to consider the position adopted by the international community, as given the developments from 2013 onwards with the coup d’état and the authoritarian regime of el-Sisi, one would have expected the international community to have either vocalised their concerns against the election of Morsi as president, or if Morsi had the support of the international community, vocalised their concerns and made public their condemnation of the coup d’état.

428. The curious position adopted by the international community therefore was one of complete contradiction.

429. Having been elected president, Morsi was congratulated by US president Barack Obama by telephone, and further, messages of congratulations were sent by the


\textsuperscript{345} Ibid

\textsuperscript{346} Ibid

\textsuperscript{347} Ibid
UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, and other respected members of the international community.348

430. It was recognised that Egypt was moving though a transitional phase, and therefore many of the messages congratulated the decision, congratulated the process which had been free and fair, and further, expressed their hope for the future.

431. Neither the electoral process, nor the result was condemned or criticised.

432. What had been raised as a concern however was how President would be able to deliver on his commitments to reform and implement democratic principles given the power still held by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, of SCAF, the ruling power during the 17 months since the resignation of Mubarak.349

433. SCAF which had already sought to reduce the amount of power held by the president, and SCAF that already sought to dissolve parliament on the spurious basis that it been elected in a process that was no in accordance with the constitution.350

434. Given the level of involvement of SCAF at the outset, post-revolution, it is certainly arguable that the odds were immediately stacked against Morsi, and any regime for that matter would seek to bring about genuine reform, rather than attempts that would simply pay lip-service to the will of the people.

435. There is an argument that Morsi had been ‘set up to fail’, thus giving SCAF and the military the excuse they needed to regain power and stop the transitional phase towards democracy and further consolidate its own power base by electing one of its own.


350 Ibid
Chapter 7: The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt post-Sisi coup

436. The most simplistic way of looking at the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, is that they are a terrorist organisation and therefore should be investigated, should be prosecuted, and where appropriate punished.

437. Much of the rhetoric including that rehearsed in the report that pre-empted this\(^{351}\) refers to the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, and how such designation was supported by the Egyptian people, alluding to a central role played by the Brotherhood in the violent aftermath that followed the seizure of power by el-Sisi and the military.

438. This however, is an all too simplistic, and altogether incorrect characterisation of the Brotherhood, and the FJP.

439. Like the report commissioned by the State Litigation Authority however,\(^{352}\) the political position and the, albeit short, tenure of President Morsi, is to be discussed in subsequent reports to this. There are however certain issues that must be raised so as to set the scene for the removal of Morsi, and the consequences of an on-going and state supported violent crackdown on members and supporters of the Brotherhood in Egypt.

440. The unfortunate reality of the situation, is that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt went from the very highest echelons of power to suffering “one of the worst waves of repression in the movement’s history”, \(^{353}\) which brought Egypt to a position comparable, if not an even more oppressive and totalitarian rule than that which it suffered under the rule of Mubarak.


\(^{352}\) Ibid

441. Mention has been made previously in this report, of the role of the military in Egyptian state apparatus, and how it is arguable that it was the military that ruled Egypt, that is until Mubarak sought to transfer power to interior and intelligence ministries, thus side-lining the military.\(^{354}\)

442. The malign influence of the military can be seen almost immediately after the stepping down of Mubarak, and during the first independent and free elections in Egypt.

443. The transfer of power to democratic and therefore civilian rule started with parliamentary elections.

444. The Muslim Brotherhood supported Freedom and Justice party secured 47.2 per cent of the vote, and the more conservative Salafist al-Nour Party secured 24.3 per cent of the vote.\(^{355}\)

445. As a result, parties espousing an Islamic ideology secured 73 per cent of the seats of the People’s Assembly.

446. The Constitutional Court however ruled one third of the parliamentary seats to be unconstitutional and thus dissolved the parliament.\(^{356}\)

447. The reality however, is that it was the military that had engineered the dissolution of this first parliament, as well as the reducing the president’s powers. This we immediately see the desperation of the military to retain power.

448. Upon coming to power, president Morsi asserted his authority by replacing the Minister of Defence and the Chief of General Staff with his own choices, and further, asking for the retirement of seventy prominent generals,\(^{357}\) and thus the

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\(^{356}\) Ibid

scene was set for the on-going power struggle between the legitimately elected president of Egypt, and an army, in fear of losing its grip on power.

449. We must now fast-forward a little to the removal of Morsi by a military, backed by one Abdal Fattah el-Sisi.

450. On 3 July 2013 a coalition, led by General el-Sisi, took part in a military coup d’état, removing President Morsi from power, and suspending the Egyptian Constitution.\(^{358}\)

451. This was followed by the declaration that the Muslim Brotherhood was a terrorist organisation that all of its activities were criminalised, and its finances seized. Membership or support of the Brotherhood was thereafter to constitute a criminal offence.\(^{359}\)

452. The justification for this announcement was the suicide bombing that sought to target a Nile Delta city police headquarters in Mansoura, an attack in which 16 people were killed and over 100 wounded.

453. The reality of this attack however is that it wasn’t the Brotherhood who carried out the attack or expressed support for it. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by an al-Qaeda inspired group, and yet this point was ignored by the regime.

454. Hossam Eissa, minister for Higher Education read out the cabinet statement and in noted in particular “Egypt was horrified from north to south by the hideous crime committed by the Muslim Brotherhood group.”\(^{360}\) There can be no doubt that Egypt would indeed have been horrified by the attack, however, no evidence has been thus far disclosed that would point to Brotherhood member involvement. This

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\(^{360}\) Ibid
point however did not fit the political objective; an objective that was to eliminate any opposition to what is effectively, military rule.

455. Despite the clear intention of the cabinet, the position on the streets was somewhat different, in that Morsi, therefore the Freedom and Justice Party still enjoyed significant support amongst citizens\textsuperscript{361} and expressed their will through peaceful protest.

456. Perhaps the most significant was that which took place at Raba’a Square.

457. Between 3 July and 14 August 2013, tens of thousands of largely peaceful supporters of Morsi, including many women and children, held an open-ended sit-in, demanding his re-instatement, and denouncing what was obviously a coup d’état.

458. This on-going show of support was however both an embarrassment and a threat to a regime that had no legitimacy or credibility.

459. On August 14, security forces attacked the protest encampment using bulldozers, armoured personnel carriers, ground troops, and snipers. 817 civilians were documented as being killed, although the figure is likely to be over 1000, and countless more injured.\textsuperscript{362}

460. As noted by Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, the attack on civilians in Raba’a, “…wasn’t merely a case of excessive force or poor training. It was a violent crackdown planned at the highest levels of the Egyptian government”.\textsuperscript{363}

461. It is notable that not one person has been held accountable for any of the offences committed that day in Raba’a.


\textsuperscript{363} Ibid
462. The incident however is unfortunately one of many, and further, is indicative of the el-Sisi regime’s approach to any that dare voice an opposing view generally, and specifically, members or supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.

463. Critics of the brief regime of Morsi suggest that there were moves towards an authoritarian regime\textsuperscript{364}, this is an incorrect characterisation, although an issue to be analysed in a subsequent report. However, none can accuse Morsi of effectively criminalising those exercising their democratic right to oppose the government, as el-Sisi did during the referendum on whether to accept the newly drafted constitution.

464. The most notable case perhaps being 3 youths who were detained by state security forces simply for having campaign material that supported the ‘No’ campaign.\textsuperscript{365}

465. Nor can Morsi be accused of totally derogating from the rule of law when dealing with those who might not necessarily agree with his position.

466. The same cannot be said for el-Sisi, who has caused Egypt to now become synonymous with politically motivated trials,\textsuperscript{366} and a judiciary infected with the will and demands of politicians.\textsuperscript{367} A state of affairs thought to have been consigned to history following the end to the show trials of Stalin in Soviet Russia.\textsuperscript{368}

467. The examples of the lack of respect for the rule of law and fair trial principles are too numerous to encapsulate within a chapter of a report, and are actually worthy


\textsuperscript{367} Ibid

of a report of their own. However we must consider some of the starkest examples so to evidence the point.

468. The most reported is perhaps that of the ‘Al Jazeera 3’. Three journalists from Al Jazeera were accused of assisting a terrorist organisation, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, convicted and imprisoned accordingly.

469. The case caused widespread condemnation from all corners of the globe given that the charges were quite clearly spurious, could not be substantiated with any evidence, and were quite clearly a politically motivated charge so as to heap pressure on Qatar to relinquish its support for Brotherhood members.

470. Just as the three journalists effectively became political pawns, the Egyptian security services and judiciary continued to seek to eradicate all those that dared disagree with the regime of el-Sisi.

471. In March 2014, 529 people were sentenced to death in Minya, following a trial process that was concluded in under one hour, where the prosecution did not adduce any evidence that implicated an individual defendant, and where the defence were prevented from calling witnesses or presenting their case.

472. There have been numerous subsequent ‘mass trials’, none of which conform to even domestic standards in Egypt, much less those international standards to which Egypt is bound.

473. Quite apart from the specific instances of mass trials which unfortunately appear to have become the norm rather than the exception, the violent crackdown on Brotherhood members and supporters has resulted in an estimated 16,000

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370 Ibid


individuals arrested, detained, or imprisoned, whilst the activist group Wikithawra estimates that this figure is in fact over 40,000.\textsuperscript{373}

474. Of those, numerous have been detained for exercising the basic democratic right of ‘the right to peaceful assembly’, a right that has been dramatically restricted by the el-Sisi regime, which enforces Law 107 of 2013 on protests which requires demonstrations to have prior authorisation.\textsuperscript{374} Those demonstrations often being met by the use of excessive force by the security services, quickly followed by arbitrary arrest, torture, and extra-judicial killing.

475. It is of course accepted that not everyone who supports Morsi or the Brotherhood, either tacitly or overtly, has been arrested, nor is it suggested that every individual currently detained is such a supporter. However, the reality is that since the wholly inappropriate designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, it has provided the Egyptian security services with an all too convenient justification or excuse to arrest those it deems a threat, or those having opposed the current regime.

476. The Muslim Brotherhood therefore has through clear state design, become the nationwide scapegoat for any unrest.

477. The reality, is that terrorism is a façade, it is state justification for impunity and rampant and excessive force to be used against those that simply seek to offer an alternative view to that which forms the rhetoric of the regime, and those that oppose military rule.

478. It is the tactic of fear, so as to attempt to corral the Egyptian population into believing that it is only the military and el-Sisi that can protect the state and its citizens. There is however a significant risk that with the new found awareness amongst the citizens of Egypt, and the appetite for expression of will, el-Sisi may find himself subjected to a popular movement and one which he can only oppress for so long.


\textsuperscript{374} \textit{Ibid}
479. As we consider the developments in Egypt post-Morsi, we see how the veil of the road to democracy is starting to slip and the true face of Egyptian political reality is revealed. A military backed dictatorship where opposition is punishable with imprisonment and often death.

480. It is here under this oppression that we now find the Brotherhood. However the autocratic regime seeking the eradication of the Brotherhood may find that the opposite is true. The Brotherhood made mistakes during its tenure in power through the Freedom and Justice Party; however, they have now effectively become victims rather than the pariah that the coup and subsequent crackdown sought to achieve. A mantle that will provide it with further capital in the long run.

481. In the interim however, and despite the genuine attempts to begin to reform Egypt for the better, and despite their obvious commitment to democracy, they are now seen as legitimate targets by the state, and the victim of an advanced government machine that seeks to eradicate opposition by any means.
Chapter 8: Conclusions

482. This report is by no means an authoritative assessment on the Muslim Brotherhood, the subject is too wide and to hold the report out as being the definitive guide to the hierarchal, and ideological structure, would be folly.

483. What the report does show however is that the reality appears to be somewhat different to the myth, as is often the case, and further, it is the myth that is advanced by the media, by right wing hysteria, and by an illegitimate President that lacks any semblance of credibility.

484. The conclusions to be drawn from this report cause the argument that the Brotherhood is a terrorist group, to quickly unravel.

485. The Muslim Brotherhood is a peaceful organisation, and an organisation that is acts in accordance with those best interests of the citizens, respecting and enhancing democratic principles, and further, seeking to address issues for the benefit of society.

486. Much is made of groups that have some sort of ‘tie’ to the Brotherhood, no matter how tenuous, when such groups follow and espouse an extremist ideology, yet, on a deeper examination of the position, we can see that these groups only became groups in their own right because the direction that they wanted to take was rejected by the Brotherhood and thus to continue upon that path they would have to form a separate group.

487. Chapter 4 of this report is littered with references to ‘splinter groups’ who rejected the Brotherhood path of legitimate political means.

488. As we consider at the outset, and as a common theme throughout the report, the Brotherhood as an ‘entity’ cannot be judged by the actions of others that once played their part within the movement. Much the same as we cannot judge those that follow an alternative faith by the actions of those that follow an extreme or warped interpretation.
489. The ‘true’ position however does not serve the purpose of a right wing media, nor does it serve the purpose of a President who desperately craves, and needs domestic and international legitimacy.

490. It is therefore of no surprise that any links between the Brotherhood and terrorism are exploited to the fullest extent.

491. Further, it is accepted that there has been a demonstrable and significant increase in domestic and international terrorism over recent years, however, we cannot consider such attacks in isolation, and must look at the wider political climate.

492. In effect, history is repeating itself, in that, as per any autocratic and authoritarian regime, when steps are taken to silence dissent, prevent opposition, and thus bring about the removal of the ‘middle ground’ politically, there are always those who will pursue ever increasingly extreme tactics to make themselves heard and bring about change.

493. It is not suggested by any means that such tactics are justified, however, it is a sad reality that such incidents will occur.

494. This is precisely what has happened throughout history, and precisely what is happening now across certain parts of the middle-east, the reasonable ‘middle’ opposition has been removed, and there are those that do not see that there will be any change in this situation and thus they pursue alternative means.

495. However, those means do not fit with the ideology of those groups that they currently represent and thus they create their own group and denounce the previous, moderate, and appropriate group for failing to achieve its objectives.

496. This is a theme that runs throughout this report, and unfortunately, it is not one that has been recognised by either the el-Sisi regime, or any such comparable regime.

497. To rehearse a long quoted phrase “Those that do not heed the mistakes of the past are doomed to repeat them”.
Egypt today has shown that it has learnt nothing from the past, much less its own past, and thus the prevalence of violence will increase as will the rise of extremist groups, until, there is respect for democratic principles, and thus the people are granted their demands; to live in a free, fair, and democratic state.